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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This following study is a “meta-evaluation” of the way aid agencies evaluate and assess their 
trade-related operations – and was undertaken as part of the OECD’s broader efforts to improve the 
effectiveness of aid-for-trade. It focuses on 162 evaluations of operations in two countries - Ghana and 
Vietnam - and two sectors - transport and storage - between 1999 and 2010. In particular, it looks at 
whether trade was a true objective of the operations under scrutiny, and whether trade and 
development outcomes were evaluated. More broadly, it asks whether the evaluations selected offer 
the information that policy makers in charge of international aid want – and need - to get from field 
evaluators. 
This report's methodology rests on quantitative measurement as well as qualitative analysis. It 
examines how often key words or expressions occur in the entire set of evaluations, in an effort to 
reveal the implicit interests of evaluators. It does the same with a narrower set of evaluations that are 
much more closely focused on trade-related matters. Next it undertakes a closer reading of a more 
narrow set of evaluations, looking beyond the immediate issues treated by the evaluators and 
analyzing the content of key words and phrases in order to determine how core issues were considered.  
This dual approach leads to the following conclusions. First, evaluations of aid-for-trade 
operations do not say much about trade.  “Trade” and “exports” were not among the most frequently 
mentioned words, while “imports” was almost completely ignored. Similarly, references to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) or regional trade agreements were largely absent from the evaluations. The 
qualitative reading yields similar conclusions.  Not only was the trade impact of operations clearly not 
the main focus of evaluators’ work, but — in a number of cases — it is not even addressed. 
Second, and unexpectedly, the evaluations usually did not clarify the policy linkages which 
matter most to policy makers. For example, the potential impact—positive or negative—of trade 
policy instruments, such as tariffs, quotas or subsidies, on funded projects was not assessed or even 
examined. Nor were the linkages with “behind the border” measures, such as regulatory reforms or 
private-sector policies, evaluated.  While some relevant terms appear in a number of evaluations, 
subsequent qualitative analysis suggests that these terms were not well understood or defined by 
evaluators, and there usage was not substantiated by reference to hard evidence. 
Third, in sharp contrast with the surprising silence on trade-related issues, the evaluations 
referred extensively to broad, development-related concepts, such as gender or poverty reduction, but 
without clearly defining these terms. This tendency to favour generic concepts over precise terms often 
meant that the evaluations were vague and ill-focused. For instance, gender was either mentioned in 
passing, as a cross-cutting issue in operations, or measured in terms of short-term objectives that had 
little tangible relevance to a project's impact on women’s economic or societal situation (e.g., they 
merely added up the number of women participating in a given seminar). 
Fourth, the evaluations often lacked an adequate or realistic timeframe for measuring results, 
rarely distinguishing between what was achievable in the short run, and what was achievable in the 
longer run. Following DAC guidelines, most evaluations assessed whether project implementation 
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deadlines were met and budgets were respected, and whether the overall operations' were relevant, 
efficient and sustainable. However, medium- to long-term impacts were never properly measured for 
particularly key factors, such as assessing an operation's investment returns. Two facts may explain 
this omission. First, little ex ante economic analysis of the operations was undertaken in most cases, 
resulting in a lack of both quantifiable definitions of objectives and of baseline data or information 
from which evaluators could measure impacts. Second, and consequently, there was little economic 
analysis undertaken in most evaluations, and the use of sophisticated tools, such as economic and 
econometric modelling, was a rarity. In short, the quantitative and qualitative analyses point to similar 
conclusions. 
Fifth, and finally, the evaluations' conclusions provide little insight as to whether aid for trade 
works and why. Indeed, evaluators were rarely able to identify causal links between operations and 
performance. One key problem seems to have been a lack of sustainable financing in many of the 
operations surveyed, with the result that projects were often terminated prematurely. Another key 
problem seems to have been the challenge of addressing both economic growth and poverty reduction 
objectives – when the two can sometimes conflict. Last but not least, there was occasionally a problem 
of poor project implementation, making it difficult, if not impossible, to assess an operation's impact 
on trade and poverty-reduction.  
However, these findings need to be put into perspective. The failure to refer to specific trade 
results can be explained at least in part by the absence of closely trade-related objectives in the initial 
mandate of the operations. Moreover, in the case of ‘aid policies’ generally - and aid-for trade policies 
in particular - it is almost always more difficult to assess an operation's sector- or economy-wide 
impact – than to assess the performance of a specific project in a specific context - given the complex 
array of extraneous variables influencing outcomes.   
It is also possible that the problems outlined above may pertain only to the relatively small 
sample of evaluations considered in this report. However, the fact that none of the agencies examined 
appears to perform systematically better than the others suggests that an even broader sample of 
evaluations would not fare significantly better. 
Assuming that the results outlined above are more or less representative of aid-for-trade 
evaluations generally, we offer the following two broad recommendations: First, every operation 
should include an ex ante assessment of the situation being addressed in order to (i) define objectives 
in a quantifiable way and (ii) to provide the necessary information (including data) to measure whether 
these objectives were met ex post. Second, evaluators should answer a sequence of questions, set out 
below, which could provide a framework for assessing operations’ impact in a more systematic and 
thorough way. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Aid-for-Trade Initiative has been highly successful in raising the profile of trade as a tool for 
development. Partner countries have increasingly mainstreamed trade in their development strategies, 
and donors have responded by mobilising additional resources for trade-related programmes and 
projects. With public budgets under stress in many developed and developing countries, however, the 
initiative's continued success requires a better assessment of aid-for-trade outcomes and impacts in 
terms of trade performances, poverty reduction, growth and development. 
As part of the OECD’s efforts to improve the effectiveness of aid-for-trade projects and 
programmes, and to further develop “good practices” in the evaluation of aid for trade, this paper 
presents a meta-evaluation of some 162 evaluations drawn from in the OECD DEReC database. It 
provides an overview of, and a perspective on, the way that DAC donors and international agencies 
have implemented operations, and how they have conducted their evaluations - both in terms of 
methodologies and topics covered.  
The paper is organised into four chapters. Chapter 1 explains the purpose, scope and 
methodology of the study. Chapter 2 attempts to reveal the preferences of evaluators in a quantitative 
way, based on the frequency with which key words appear in the evaluations. It also attempts to 
uncover answers to the “what we want to know” question, by focusing on both the trade and the 
development aspects of aid for trade. Complementing this quantitative approach, Chapter 3 undertakes 
a qualitative examination of a more narrow set of evaluations that are closely related to aid for trade. 
Lastly, Chapter 4 tries to answer the “what we would ideally like done” question, by recommending 
broad guidelines for future evaluations. 
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CHAPTER 1.  PURPOSES, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
Section 1. Two purposes 
The first purpose of this meta-evaluation is to assess whether the selected evaluations offer the 
information that policy makers in charge of delivering international aid would like to get from field 
evaluators. In particular, it asks whether trade was an objective of the original operations, and whether 
trade and development outcomes or impacts were taken into account in the evaluations. To the extent 
that the latter was the case, it also reports on the kind of trade, poverty reduction and development 
outcomes described in the evaluations. It should be emphasised that the aim here is not to undertake 
new evaluations of the operations already evaluated, but rather to examine whether the existing 
evaluations deliver “what we want to know”. 
Ideally “what we want to know” would cover a wide range of issues—from narrower trade 
outcomes to broader development results. Trade outcomes are important because trade is a proven 
engine for growth. However, trade is not an end in itself.  The ultimate goal of aid-for-trade is to help 
countries to harness trade behind development and poverty reduction objective – objectives which 
themselves have many dimensions, from income creation, to income distribution, to broader social 
concerns (such as gender equality or environmental sustainability). 
The second purpose of this meta-evaluation is to propose a set of guidelines (indicators, 
quantitative and qualitative techniques, etc.) for undertaking future evaluations. In short, to provide a 
tentative answer to the question “what we would ideally like done”. Two types of guidelines could be 
proposed that, in our view, are complements rather than substitutes. The first would be general 
guidelines – involving minimal time, skills and financial resources - to improve the routine evaluation 
of any operation. The second would be more specific guidelines – involving detailed data collection 
and specific technical skills – to help undertake more thorough and intensive evaluations of operations' 
impacts.  Since this second approach is much more expensive and time consuming, it is probably 
applicable only to a carefully chosen subset of all operations. As a result, this paper focuses on the first 
approach. 
Section 2.  Scope 
The paper covers a set of evaluations, identified by the OECD Secretariat, covering two countries 
- Ghana and Vietnam - and two sectors - transport and storage (for the purposes of this analysis, 
transport and storage have been aggregated into one sector called “TranStor”) - between 1999 and 
2010. Transport and storage were selected because these sectors have received significant amounts of 
aid for trade, and therefore provide a large number of relevant evaluations. Ghana was selected 
because it is one of the largest recipients of aid for trade in Africa, and has seen its trade expand 
significantly since 2002. Vietnam was selected because it has served as a model of trade opening for a 
number of countries, because it has enthusiastically embraced the aid-for-trade agenda, because it has 
successfully achieved export-led growth, and because it became a WTO member fairly recently, in 
2007. 
The set of selected evaluations includes only those notified to the DEReC database, not all 
evaluations undertaken in these countries and in these sectors over the time period. As a crude measure 
of this study's limited or partial scope, only 162 evaluations are examined in this meta-evaluation, 
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whereas the total number of operations conducted by DAC members between 1999 and 2008 was 
61,677. Hence, the study's results should in no way be interpreted as an exhaustive meta-evaluation of 
all evaluations of all the operations funded by international aid. 
In the current international aid context, operations which attempt to promote economic 
development by building trade capacity are often referred to as “aid for trade”. In the interests of 
simplicity, the term aid for trade will be used in this paper to describe all operations that facilitate the 
integration of developing countries into the global economy through expanded trade (for a more 
detailed definition, see Chapter 2). However, it should be noted that this term became widely accepted 
only in the mid-2000s, starting with the discussions surrounding the Millennium Development Goals 
(see, for instance, Zedillo and Messerlin 2005, Stiglitz and Charlton 2005), in the lead up to the 2005 
G8 Summit in Gleneagles, and culminating in the launch of the Aid-for-Trade Initiative at the WTO's 
2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Conference.1 
A key challenge in conducting this meta-evaluation has been to identify the extent to which 
operations could be analyzed through an aid-for-trade lens. Indeed, some of the evaluations available 
in the DEReC database for Ghana and Vietnam relate to operations which are likely to impact trade 
only in the (very) long run – for example, education or health projects. Even in the transport and 
storage sectors, operations were classified as aid for trade which had at best remote links with 
international trade. As a result, the study has identified a subset of 43 selected evaluations which have 
a more direct and immediate bearing on trade (the selection is outlined in Chapter 3). The total stock 
of evaluations under scrutiny – as well as the narrow sub-set examined in more detail - are more fully 
described in Annex A. 
Section 3.  Methodology 
A meta evaluation should reveal the implicit interests of evaluators, as well as the “distance” 
between these interests and the needs of aid-for-trade policy makers.  This requires a combination of 
quantitative measures and qualitative assessments. 
The methodology used for quantitative measurement was simple.  It relied on the occurrences of 
words or expressions that could reasonably be considered to be crucial for evaluating aid-for-trade-
related operations – and thus that one might expect to see in an evaluation (Annex B lists the 48 words 
and expressions that were considered key). This method has the advantage of relying on a clearly 
defined metric: namely the frequency with which key words are mentioned in one hundred pages. Of 
course, this metric should not be seen as “exhaustive” and “objective”, if only because it is limited to 
48 words, and because the words themselves do not necessarily serve as an entirely accurate, or even 
adequate, measure of the evaluators’ interests or policy makers' needs. Yet the word set chosen is 
probably wide enough to provide meaningful results, and to raise robust questions about the evaluation 
process in general. 
At the same time, this quantitative approach needs to be complemented by a qualitative reading, 
since the frequency with which words appear in a text may say little about the analytical content of the 
words themselves, or the context in which they were used. Such a qualitative reading was undertaken 
for a sub-set of 43 evaluations. The idea was to look beyond the set of issues explicitly treated by the 
evaluators to see how each of them was being evaluated and to assess the significance of the 
information that was being provided. 
                                                     
1
 As a result, cconsidering the time lag between the implementation of an operation and its evaluation, it is not 
surprising that operations and evaluations conducted before the mid-2000s do not refer explicitly to 
the term aid for trade. 
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CHAPTER 2.  DO THE EVALUATIONS DELIVER 
WHAT WE WANT TO KNOW? 
Summary of the results 
• Evaluations of aid-for-trade operations did not say much about trade.  The words “trade” and 
“exports” were not among the most frequently mentioned by evaluators, and the WTO or 
regional trade agreements were largely ignored. More importantly, from an economic point 
of view, the word “imports” was almost completely ignored. 
• Evaluations usually did not clarify the policy linkages which would be of interest to policy 
makers. For example, the potential impact—positive or negative—of trade policy 
instruments, such as tariffs, quotas or subsidies, on the return of internationally funded 
operations was not assessed for the simple reason that these instruments were never 
examined. Nor were the policy linkages between the operations and “behind the border” 
policies, such as regulatory reforms or private sector policies, evaluated frequently. 
• In sharp contrast with this unexpected silence on trade-related issues, evaluations were much 
more detailed and diffuse regarding broad development-related concepts.  Paradoxically, 
evaluations tend to rely on general concepts, such as gender or poverty reduction, more often 
than precise terminology, such as quotas, trade shares, or income distribution, despite near 
impossibility of using general concepts to describe operations' impacts clearly and robustly. 
• The failure to define – or differentiate among – timeframes was widespread. Evaluators 
rarely distinguished between what was expected in the short run, versus what was expected 
over the longer run. 
Introduction 
The chapter adopts a wide definition of the aid-for-trade, following the OECD’s [2006] four main 
categories: trade-related technical assistance (TRTA) and capacity building, trade-related 
infrastructure, building productive capacity, and macro- and micro-economic adjustment (illustrated in 
Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1  Aid for Trade: the agenda 
 
 
This chapter tries to give a sense of whether the selected evaluations deliver information relevant 
to the aid-for-trade agenda. Section 1 focuses on the trade dimension, while section 2 focuses on the 
development dimension. Both sections assess how frequently key words and expressions occur in the 
evaluations—a crude measure of the revealed interests of the evaluators – and try to determine 
whether or not regular patterns emerge. For instance, does a donor use the same set of words in its 
evaluations regardless of country or sector – signalling the use of precise guidelines in evaluations? Or 
do the donor's interests appear to shift according to the country or sector under consideration – 
suggesting the absence of firm guidelines? 
In order to determine whether an underlying pattern emerges, an arbitrary convention is used.  It 
is assumed that 25 occurrences or more of a given word or expression per 100 pages represents a 
substantial and permanent interest in the word under scrutiny - and hence of the issue that it is 
supposed to represent. Such occurrences are coloured in the following tables in order to get a 
“graphic” view of the bigger picture. 
Section 1.  The trade component 
If one wants to define what policy makers reading evaluations would like to learn about the trade 
aspects of aid-funded operations, four main topics should be raised:  
i) the extent to which evaluations capture the role of trade;  
ii) the extent to which they take into account the trade policy of the country in question; 
iii) the extent to which they refer to the trade-related issues specific to aid for trade (such as 
technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, TRTA, adjustment policies, 
trade facilitation, etc.); and  
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iv) the extent to which they take into account key international trade agreements. 
The analysis of these four questions relies on the frequency of key words and expressions (the 
number of times a word has been used per one hundred pages of evaluations). It is first analysed on a 
country/sector basis, and then on a donor basis. It is also analyzed for the overall set of 162 
evaluations, as well as for the narrower, more “aid for trade-related” set of evaluations. As mentioned 
above, the qualitative analysis in Chapter 3 focuses on a narrow set of 43 evaluations drawn from the 
larger set.2 
To what extent do evaluations capture the role of trade? 
This broad question can be split into more precise questions, each captured by a key word or 
expression. Have evaluators simply mentioned the word “trade”?  Or have they been more precise by 
referring to the two sides of trade—“exports” and/or “imports”?  The words exports and imports 
themselves have very different connotations. One would expect exports to be a visible trade indicator 
in aid-funded operations aimed at a better integrating developing countries into the world economy – 
and indeed the aid for trade agenda typically focuses on the importance of exports. However, from an 
economic perspective, imports are ever more important than exports because they are the channel 
through which cheaper and/or better goods, services, investments and innovations are made available 
to domestic consumers— whether households or firms. In other words, imports are a critical input for 
future growth and development, while exports are mostly the means by which countries buy much 
needed imports. 
The recipient perspective 
Table 2.1A presents the frequency with which the key words attached to the above questions 
appeared in the evaluations, aggregated by recipients. Three main observations arise: First, broadly 
speaking, the trade aspect - defined as the combined occurrences of the words “trade”, “exports” and 
“imports” - was relatively prominent (frequencies above 50 occurrences per 100 pages are rarely 
observed for other key words or expressions, as shown below). Moreover, the frequency with which 
trade terms were mentioned was substantially higher for Vietnam than for Ghana. 
Second, the focus was clearly on exports rather than imports, reflecting a possible lack of 
economic understanding of the latter's role in growth and development. 
Third, the trade and export terms appeared relatively more frequently in the narrow set of 
evaluations than in the overall set for the two countries and sectors.  This seems to justify the decision 
to look beyond the overall set of evaluations, and to focus on a narrower set for the qualitative 
assessment (see Chapter 4). A similar pattern does not emerge across the TranStor sector. Because 
many TranStor operations relate mainly to domestic, as opposed to international, infrastructure (i.e., 
roads or railways might link two cities but have little direct impact on trade), one might have expected 
even bigger differences between the two sets of evaluations, but this does not appear to have been the 
case. 
                                                     
2
 There is a minor difference between the narrow set used in this chapter and the one used in Chapter 4.  The 
evaluations done by IOB (Ghana) and EBRD, NEI and NORAD (Vietnam) are not reported in this chapter 
because these four donors have reported to DEReC only one evaluation for the three fields (Ghana, Vietnam 
and TranStor). 
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Table 2.1A.  The role of trade by recipient 
 
Ghana Vietnam Transtor Ghana Vietnam Transtor
How trade is mentioned?
Is "trade" mentioned? 8.2 31.0 22.2 13.0 159.6 43.6
Which component of trade is mentioned:  exports? 15.7 12.8 7.9 27.7 60.9 12.7
Which component of trade is mentioned:  imports? 6.2 5.6 3.9 10.1 12.2 6.5
How is trade understood?
as a macro-economic issue: trade balance? 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
as a pure trade issue:  comparative advantages? 1.8 1.5 0.7 1.7 1.1 1.7
as a production issue:  diversification? 1.8 0.7 0.1 2.8 1.0 1.0
as a welfare issue:  gains from trade? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Overall set Narrow set
 
Source: DEReC database. Authors' computations 
Beyond observations about how frequently trade was mentioned in the evaluations, it is also 
interesting to note how evaluators perceived the relationship between trade and other policies. This 
question has four dimensions: (i) Do evaluators see trade as a macroeconomic issue (an approach 
which would be revealed by the frequency of reference to trade balances)? (ii) Do they see trade as 
critical to helping countries strengthen comparative advantages in the world economy? (iii)  Do they 
see trade as a means of diversifying domestic production? (iv) And do they see trade leading to a 
reallocation of domestic resources in a way that increases a country’s overall welfare? The answers to 
these four questions reveal the implicit “policy linkages” that evaluators might have in mind. 
The second part of Table 2.1A suggests that evaluators were not much concerned with clarifying 
such policy linkages - if indeed these linkages were even considered. Specifically, it was not clear that 
trade was perceived as a macroeconomic issue – or that macroeconomic imbalances were seen as a 
trade policy concern. This neglect is somewhat worrisome, particularly for country-case evaluations. 
The donor perspective 
Table 2.1B presents the frequency with which key words appeared in evaluations of donor 
operations. The overall set of evaluations rendered several interesting insights. First, the same patterns 
observed in Table 2.1A were repeated for almost every donor, suggesting a “parallel” behaviour 
amongst donors when evaluating their operations in a given country or sector. In other words, the 
observations drawn from Table 2.1A were not artificial averages. Such parallel behaviour is easy to 
explain, since the questions related to how often trade was mentioned. What is more puzzling was 
evaluators' low level of interest in clarifying trade's implicit policy linkages. 
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Table 2.1B.  The role of trade by donor, the overall set of evaluations 
 
Af
D
B
AF
D
C
ID
A
D
AN
ID
A
D
FI
D
EC Ja
pa
n
SI
D
A
U
SA
ID
W
B
Al
l
W
. s
td
Af
D
B
AF
D
D
AN
ID
A
D
FI
D
EC W
B
Al
l
W
. s
td
How trade is mentioned?
Is "trade" taken into consideration? 2.2 10.3 2.6 6.3 6.7 54.0 0.0 1.9 1.5 2.6 6.7 1.8 2.1 6.9 4.7 9.1 54.0 25.0 11.1 1.2
Which component of trade is mentioned:  exports? 17.7 19.0 0.0 7.0 3.0 58.9 0.0 0.0 0.5 6.1 8.7 1.6 29.6 19.0 8.3 4.7 58.9 84.1 17.9 0.9
Which component of trade is mentioned:  imports? 27.3 12.1 28.9 1.7 40.6 4.0 26.9 27.9 24.9 28.8 23.9 0.6 5.8 0.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 50.0 4.2 1.8
How is trade understood?
as a macro-economic issue:  trade balance? 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.8 0.0 0.2 1.9
as a pure trade issue:  comparative advantages? 4.6 0.0 0.0 1.5 1.9 2.2 0.0 2.9 0.3 1.4 2.1 1.0 6.9 0.0 0.4 2.0 2.4 11.4 2.3 1.2
as a production issue:  diversification? 2.2 8.9 5.3 1.0 0.4 24.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 2.0 1.8 2.6 8.6 1.0 0.5 24.2 4.5 3.7 1.3
as a welfare issue:  gains from trade? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 --
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How trade is mentioned?
Is "trade" taken into consideration? 41.9 7.5 2.9 15.7 193.7 30.8 0.0 199.2 9.6 17.0 8.1 31.0 1.6 167.1 340.4 35.3 199.2 14.1 159.6 0.9
Which component of trade is mentioned:  exports? 11.2 16.3 0.0 7.2 19.3 12.5 0.0 246.2 4.7 7.2 1.2 12.8 2.4 31.4 36.4 13.0 246.2 2.6 60.9 1.5
Which component of trade is mentioned:  imports? 5.9 0.0 5.9 0.0 12.1 0.0 0.0 5.4 6.4 4.6 0.2 5.6 1.1 20.4 11.1 0.0 5.4 1.3 12.2 1.1
How is trade understood?
as a macro-economic issue:  trade balance? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 --
as a pure trade issue:  comparative advantages? 0.6 1.3 0.0 1.2 2.9 0.0 0.0 3.8 2.1 0.7 0.7 1.5 1.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 3.8 1.3 1.1 1.3
as a production issue:  diversification? 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.7 2.1 1.5 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.4
as a welfare issue:  gains from trade? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 --
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How trade is mentioned?
Is "trade" taken into consideration? 30.5 26.8 6.9 0.0 0.0 2.8 16.2 22.2 1.1 51.3 29.4 27.7 0.0 31.1 43.6 0.7
Which component of trade is mentioned:  exports? 7.9 13.8 2.0 0.0 26.3 0.7 8.5 7.9 1.1 34.1 14.4 8.5 26.3 6.7 12.7 0.7
Which component of trade is mentioned:  imports? 5.0 8.0 0.5 0.0 5.3 0.0 1.6 3.9 1.1 7.6 10.0 2.1 5.3 1.1 6.5 0.7
How is trade understood?
as a macro-economic issue:  trade balance? 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 --
as a pure trade issue:  comparative advantages? 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.7 1.1 1.8 3.1 4.3 0.0 0.4 1.7 0.9
as a production issue:  diversification? 0.8 1.3 1.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.2 1.4 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.4
as a welfare issue:  gains from trade? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 --
Vietnam Vietnam
Transtor Transtor
Overall set of evaluations Narrow set of evaluations
Ghana Ghana
 
Notes: WB: World Bank, J-Eval: joint evaluations. W.Std: weighted standard deviations 
Source: DEReC database. Authors’ computations.  
Two additional patterns are worth noting. First, there was a wider spectrum of frequencies for 
Vietnam than for Ghana (as revealed by higher variances for Vietnam on exports). At first glance, this 
might seem to be the result of the dominance of one donor, SECO, in Vietnam. However, eliminating 
SECO does not dramatically narrow this difference. Second, the three joint evaluations in Vietnam 
were in the low band of frequencies. 
The narrow set of evaluations provides interesting additional information.  It amplifies massively 
the reference to “trade” and “exports”, except for Ghana. But there was almost no change regarding 
how trade – and its implicit policy linkages - was understood by evaluators. All these observations will 
be substantiated in more detail in the qualitative analysis in Chapter 4. 
To which extent do evaluations refer to the trade policy of countries? 
Another relevant question is whether evaluators understood a country's broader trade and 
economic policy context, especially in the TranStor sector, and whether they appreciated its 
relationship to – and impact on – operations. For example, the returns from aid-funded operations 
might vary greatly depending on whether a country imposed moderate and stable tariffs, or high and 
volatile tariffs. Another important variable is whether the country is landlocked. Reducing tariffs could 
provide only small benefits if transport costs are high and transport infrastructure is poor or non-
existent. Such constraints can represent “tax-equivalents” many times higher than import tariffs. By 
the same token, even sizable infrastructure investments can generate low returns if existing high tariffs 
are not reduced. 
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In this context, two successive questions should be asked. Have evaluators simply looked at 
“trade restrictions” without examining their nature and context in more detail? Or have they gone 
further and looked in detail at the three main trade policy instruments—tariffs, quotas and subsidies) 
—and their potentially very different effects and costs? 
The recipient perspective 
Turning to evaluations on the recipients’ side, the results presented in Table 2.2A give rise to two 
observations. First, evaluators largely ignored the general term “trade restrictions”, despite the 
potential impact such restrictions could have on the operations' returns. This was the case for both the 
broad and the narrow sets of evaluations. The fact that this observation can be made for the narrow set 
of evaluations is especially significant, given that a key criterion in selecting the narrow set in the 
TranStor sector (as explained in Chapter 3) was an explicit international trade dimension in the 
evaluations. 
Table 2.2A.  The role of trade policy, by recipient 
Ghana Vietnam Transtor Ghana Vietnam Transtor
In broad terms:  trade restrictions? 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
In terms of specific instruments?
tariffs? 2.4 8.2 9.9 3.3 12.0 12.8
quotas? 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0
subsidies? 2.2 3.4 3.1 2.7 2.8 3.7
Overall set Narrow set
 
Source: DEReC database. Authors' computations 
Second, evaluators were only marginally more aware of the existence of trade instruments. 
Tariffs showed a low frequency, and subsidies were even lower, despite the fact that most aid-funded 
operations in the TranStor sector ultimately have a substantial subsidy component. Turning to 
subsidies, evaluators tended to limit their analysis to a comparison of subsidy schemes provided by 
various countries. They stop short of assessing whether such subsidies were desirable or not—their 
indirect message being that subsidies were desirable only if they did not endanger the government 
budget (see illustrations for Ghana and Vietnam in Chapter 3). 
Third, evaluators were largely silent on quotas, although this instrument is likely to have the most 
perverse and negative development impact, since quotas are opaque, can generate high distortions, and 
encourage costly rent-seeking behaviour among domestic and foreign firms alike. 
Lastly, the awareness of such instruments was higher in the case of Vietnam - a country that was 
in the process of undertaking much faster and deeper liberalization than Ghana. This may reflect the 
fact that Vietnam’s trade policy was rapidly evolving during the period, whereas Ghana’s trade policy 
was less active. At the same time, it raises serious questions about the usefulness of evaluations if they 
do address existing policies that can have a direct bearing on the success of the operations. 
The donor perspective 
Table 2.2B shifts the focus to donors – and asks whether the above observations apply uniformly 
to all donors or whether there are “atypical” cases. 
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Once again donors show parallel behaviour, as illustrated by low variances. In particular, no 
evaluator paid attention to trade restrictions in the TranStor sector for the two countries. Variances 
were higher for tariffs and subsidies, with AfDB and AsDB acknowledging the importance of tariffs in 
Ghana and Vietnam, and only the AFD highlighting the relevance of subsidies (with the above caveat 
on the impact analysis). The TranStor case was not comparable because the word “tariff” was often 
used as an equivalent of the word “price” (e.g., “water tariff”). 
Table 2.2B.  The role of trade policy, by donor 
 
Af
D
B
AF
D
CI
D
A
D
AN
ID
A
D
FI
D
EC Ja
pa
n
SI
D
A
U
SA
ID
W
B
Al
l
W
. s
td
Af
D
B
AF
D
D
AN
ID
A
D
FI
D
EC W
B
Al
l
W
. s
td
In broad terms:  trade restrictions? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 --
In terms of specific instruments?
tariffs? 14.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.6 6.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 2.2 2.1 15.3 0.0 0.2 1.0 6.5 4.5 3.3 1.3
quotas? 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.2 0.2 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.2 1.9
subsidies? 0.9 19.0 0.0 0.5 2.2 0.8 7.7 0.0 0.0 2.7 1.9 1.8 0.5 19.0 0.6 3.4 0.8 0.0 2.3 1.8
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In broad terms (trade restrictions)? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 --
In terms of specific instruments?
tariffs? 21.1 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.5 3.1 1.3 1.4 8.2 2.3 24.0 1.0 0.0 2.5 1.3 12.0 1.8
quotas? 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.5 1.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.2
subsidies? 6.4 13.8 0.0 0.0 1.9 8.3 7.7 0.0 2.1 0.7 0.0 3.4 1.3 0.5 2.0 7.8 0.0 12.8 2.8 1.2
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In broad terms (trade restrictions)? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 --
In terms of specific instruments?
tariffs? 15.1 2.9 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.3 13.7 9.9 1.5 38.0 1.3 2.1 0.0 4.1 12.8 1.8
quotas? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.1 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 --
subsidies? 5.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 3.4 3.1 1.5 4.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.1 3.7 1.4
Vietnam Vietnam
Transtor Transtor
Ghana Ghana
Overall set of evaluations Narrow set of evaluations
 
Notes: WB: World Bank, J-Eval: joint evaluations, W.Std: weighted standard deviations. 
Source: DEReC database. Authors' computations 
To what extent do evaluations refer to trade-related issues specific to aid for trade? 
As illustrated in Figure 2.1, the aid-for-trade agenda covers a much wider set of trade-related 
policies than the basic trade instruments examined in the previous paragraphs. These issues include: 
(i) ”technical barriers to trade” (TBT) for industrial goods, (ii) “sanitary and photo-sanitary standards” 
(SPS) for agricultural products, (iii) trade facilitation, (iv) adjustment policies (especially those 
associated with helping countries adjust to trade opening), and (v) trade assistance. This section 
examines whether these issues emerged in the selected evaluations. 
The recipient perspective 
Table 2.3A suggests that, within the overall set of evaluations, these issues were, by and large, 
ignored. However, within the narrow set of evaluations, references to SPS standards, trade facilitation 
(in the TranStor sector), adjustment policies (in Ghana), and trade assistance (in Vietnam) surface 
more frequently. 
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Table 2.3A.  The “Aid for Trade” wider set of trade issues, by recipient 
Ghana Vietnam Transtor Ghana Vietnam Transtor
Technical barriers to trade? 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 11.4 0.0
Sanitary and phytosanitary standards? 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 18.3 0.0
Trade facilitation? 0.0 3.3 3.9 0.1 23.5 11.3
Adjustment policies? 0.0 3.6 4.0 12.9 2.7 4.3
Trade assistance? 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 12.5 0.1
Trade-related technical assistance? 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0
Overall set Narrow set
 
Source: DEReC database. Authors' computations 
Some of these results are puzzling. The almost total absence of references to TBTs, SPS 
standards, and trade-related technical assistance is particularly surprising, given the high priority that 
both recipients and donors typically place on these topics. It should be noted that the relative 
frequency with which trade facilitation was mentioned in Vietnam may be less impressive than it 
appears, given that Vietnam was the second-largest recipient of trade facilitation-related aid in the 
world between 1999 and 2008, with 65 projects (or 2.6 per cent of all projects in the world Source: 
Database CRS/DAC OCDE). Similarly, it is surprising that adjustment policies were mentioned more 
frequently for Ghana than for Vietnam by a significant margin, given that Ghana had a more stable 
product composition of exports and imports than Vietnam over the decade examined, particularly in 
the most recent years. This heightened sensitivity to adjustment issues in Ghana may reflect the long 
and bitter debate in many African countries about the gains from trade and donors’ “adjustment 
programmes” of the 1980s and 1990s (see the donor perspective below). 
The donor perspective 
What are the similarities and dissimilarities among donors?  Limited variance (if any) could be 
expected among donors for topics showing low frequencies. However, the narrow set of evaluations 
revealed some substantial differences among the donors. The high score of adjustment policies in the 
World Bank's evaluations of its Ghana operations may partly reflected sensitivity towards the above 
mentioned debate on adjustment policies in Africa. Similarly, the very high score for TBT and SPS in 
the EC's and SECO's evaluations of their Vietnam operations may reveal Europe's obsession with 
these issues. 
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Table 2.3B. The “Aid for Trade” wider set of trade issues, by donor 
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Technical barriers to trade? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 --
Sanitary and phytosanitary standards? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 --
Trade facilitation 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.1 2.4
Adjustment policies? 3.7 0.0 2.6 5.8 1.7 7.3 0.0 1.9 0.0 9.8 4.7 1.0 3.7 0.0 6.5 1.7 7.3 45.5 5.7 1.6
Trade assistance? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 2.4
Trade-related technical assistance? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 --
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Technical barriers to trade? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 41.5 0.0 0.0 5.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 2.9 0.0 86.9 0.0 5.4 0.0 11.4 2.1
Sanitary and phytosanitary standards? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 37.7 0.0 0.0 54.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 2.3 0.0 78.8 0.0 54.6 0.0 18.3 1.4
Trade facilitation 10.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 7.7 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 1.9 47.4 2.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 23.5 2.0
Adjustment policies? 2.9 1.3 5.9 1.2 1.0 3.3 0.0 0.8 1.9 7.2 18.9 3.6 1.3 4.1 1.0 3.5 0.8 0.0 2.7 1.0
Trade assistance? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 48.8 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 3.3 0.0 102.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 12.5 2.2
Trade-related technical assistance? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 2.6 0.0 11.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 2.2
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Technical barriers to trade? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 --
Sanitary and phytosanitary standards? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 --
Trade facilitation 7.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 3.9 2.3 16.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 11.3 2.0
Adjustment policies? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 3.4 7.5 0.0 0.0 6.7 4.3 1.0
Trade assistance? 3.6 3.9 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.7 7.0 4.0 1.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.4
Trade-related technical assistance? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 --
Vietnam
Transtor
Overall set of evaluations Narrow set of evaluations
Ghana Ghana
Transtor
 
Notes: WB: World Bank, J-Eval: joint evaluations, W.Std: weighted standard deviations. 
Source: DEReC database. Authors' computations 
Do evaluations take into account key international trade agreements? 
The “aid-for-trade” agenda has emerged largely independently from the Doha Round and 
negotiations of regional trade agreements. Nevertheless, the debate has permeated most trade 
negotiations over the last decade. Thus, it is useful to look at whether references to key trade 
agreements were mentioned in the evaluations. The obvious candidate is the WTO’s Doha Round of 
multilateral negotiations which have largely continued throughout the period covered (starting with the 
2001 Doha Ministerial Conference and continuing passed the 2008 Geneva mini-Ministerial Meeting). 
In addition to the WTO, references to regional or preferential trade agreements would also be 
significant, since such agreements have echoed, and often amplified, WTO discussions on aid for 
trade. 
The recipient perspective 
Table 2.4A reveals an almost complete lack of reference to key trade agreements, with the 
exception of the WTO; and even the WTO references are limited to operations in Vietnam. This 
observation is not surprising, given that Vietnam’s on-going WTO accession negotiation was a key 
policy issue throughout the decade covered.3 The absence of references to trade agreements in Ghana's 
evaluations may reflect Ghana’s resistance to accepting new commitments during the Doha 
                                                     
3
 Vietnam’s negotiations for accession to the WTO started in January 1995 and were completed in November 
2006.  Vietnam is undergoing a long (yet unfinished) process of implementing its commitments.  For instance, as 
shown in Table A1 (Annex A), Vietnam’s final level of bound tariffs will be 11.4 percent, while the 2008 level 
was still 16.8 percent. 
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negotiations. It may also reflect Ghana's relatively limited involvement in regional or bilateral 
agreements, and the modest impact of those on Ghana's trade policy (for instance, ECOWAS has had a 
very limited effect on Ghana's already moderate tariffs, while the Cotonou Convention imposed no 
discipline on Ghana’s trade policy during the decade covered). In the case of the TranStor sector, the 
absence of references to trade agreements underlines the basic difficulty of negotiating services 
liberalization, particularly transport services (which have long been ruled by special international 
schemes geared towards limiting international competition), in most trade agreements. 
Table 2.4A.  International trade agreements, by recipient 
 
Ghana Vietnam Transtor Ghana Vietnam Transtor
WTO? 0.2 6.9 0.5 0.3 41.5 1.5
Regional trade agreements? 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0
Preferential trade agreements? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0
Overall set Narrow set
 
Source: DEReC database. Authors' computations 
The donor perspective 
Regarding trade agreement references in evaluations of donor operations, one finds a low 
frequency in both the overall and narrow sets. The one notable exception was the high frequency with 
which the WTO was mentioned in EC and SECO evaluations of Vietnam operations. This was in 
sharp contrast to the low profile of these key words in the Ghana evaluations. 
 
Table 2.4B.  International trade agreements, by donor 
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Regional trade agreements? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 --
Preferential trade agreements? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 --
Transtor Transtor
Overall set of evaluations Narrow set of evaluations
Ghana Ghana
Vietnam Vietnam
 
Notes: WB: World Bank, J-Eval: joint evaluations, W.Std: weighted standard deviations. 
Source: DEReC database. Authors' computations. 
Section 2.  The development component 
This section shifts the focus from trade-related issues to those more closely related to 
development. Three questions seem particularly relevant in this context:  
i) do evaluators take into account the broad constraints that an inefficient public sector could 
impose on development? 
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ii) do evaluators take into account the broad constraints related to inefficiencies in the private 
sector? 
iii) and do evaluators pay enough attention to the broad performance of the economy or sector 
examined? 
How much attention is paid to public sector-related constraints? 
An inefficient public sector can impose significant constraints on growth and development – and 
these constraints can be even more difficult to surmount in developing countries than in developed 
countries. From a development perspective, it is thus essential that evaluators give some sense of their 
perception of whether public sector-generated constraints exist, and whether such constraints had a 
substantial impact on the returns of the operations evaluated. Against this background, the following 
section looks at another spectrum of policy linkages—between aid-funded operations, infrastructure 
policies and regulatory policies. 
Two questions are relevant when examining public sector-generated constraints.  First, do 
evaluators focus on the consistencies – or inconsistencies – among physical infrastructure projects that 
might impact on the success of the operations evaluated? Second, do evaluators focus on “regulatory 
infrastructure” issues that also impact on the success of operation? To operate efficiently, firms need 
appropriate domestic regulations as well as appropriate roads or bridges  and this “regulatory capital” 
can play as important a role as physical or human capital in economic development. The following 
section divides regulatory policies into three subsets: (i) the specific regulations closely related to the 
evaluated operations; (ii) the broad regulatory framework of the country or sector; and (iii) the even 
broader issue of “governance”. 
The recipient perspective 
Table 2.5A provides an interesting picture of how these various public sector-related constraints 
are understood by evaluators, with both the broad and the narrow sets of evaluations giving similar 
results (with the usual very limited magnification effect in the narrow set). First, it is clear that 
evaluators are concerned with physical infrastructure policies. The systematically higher frequency 
with which physical infrastructure was mentioned in the TranStor sector compared to the country 
cases suggests that evaluators are even more inclined to take a broad view of the inter-action between 
an operation and other physical infrastructure when they are already involved in sectoral infrastructure 
policy. However, the lower frequency for country cases may simply reflect evaluators' inability to take 
a “bigger picture” view of economies operating with many interactive agents (i.e., a “general 
equilibrium” perspective). 
Table 2.5A.  Public sector-related constraints, by recipient 
 
Ghana Vietnam Transtor Ghana Vietnam Transtor
Does the evaluation mention physical infrastructure problems? 15.3 21.7 38.0 20.5 46.2 66.5
Does the evaluation refer to specific regulations? 4.7 9.1 9.0 7.2 12.8 9.5
Does the evaluation refer to the broad regulatory framework? 0.9 9.7 1.9 1.5 1.7 2.4
Does the evaluation raise broad governance issues? 20.4 20.3 5.0 18.9 6.8 8.5
Overall set Narrow set
 
Source: DEReC database. Authors' computations. 
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Second, in sharp contrast, evaluators clearly showed less interest in regulatory issues—whether 
specific or general.  For Ghana in particular, references to specific regulations were infrequent, while 
references to the broad regulatory framework was almost non-existent. 
Third, references to broad governance issues were more frequent across evaluations. However, 
the problem, as underscored in the qualitative analysis, is that evaluators, with a few notable 
exceptions, often said little in detail about governance. The general impression is of evaluators paying 
lip service to a topic that is acknowledged to be crucial for economic growth and development, but on 
which they had little concrete or constructive to say. 
Lastly, it is worth noting an interesting pattern that emerged from the data. Regulatory issues 
(specific and general) had notably more salience in Vietnam than in Ghana.  This may reflect the 
impression that Vietnam’s regulatory policies are somewhat better defined than Ghana’s policies. By 
contrast, broad governance issues seemed to carry more weight in Ghana than in Vietnam. This may 
reflect the broad government's inability to design appropriate regulations. 
The donor perspective 
Given that the words and expressions related to public sector-constraints appear fairly frequently, 
one might expect substantial differences among donors. 
The overall set of evaluations revealed that only one word – i.e., infrastructure for TranStor - 
reached the threshold of 25 occurrences per 100 pages across most donor evaluations. The rest of the 
picture is patchy, with no donor expressing the same interest in a word over the evaluations for the two 
countries and the TranStor sector. If there was a pattern, it was that regional development banks 
focussed on infrastructure in the countries of their region (i.e., AfDB for Ghana, AsDB for Vietnam). 
Another pattern was that governance issues tended to attract the most attention from different donors - 
with CIDA and SIDA focusing on governance in Ghana, and DFID focusing on governance in 
Vietnam. Finally, those evaluators who show the least interest in governance issues (AFD, GTZ and 
Japan) were among those who showed the most interest in infrastructure.  
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Table 2.5B.  Public sector-related constraints, by donor 
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Mention of physical infrastructure problems? 38.8 0.0 7.9 20.5 3.0 37.1 7.7 2.9 2.5 14.2 14.9 1.1 45.5 0.0 24.2 4.2 37.1 43.2 21.9 0.8
Does the evaluation refer to specific regulations? 5.9 0.0 2.6 13.0 3.6 6.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 5.4 1.2 6.9 0.0 15.4 5.2 6.5 13.6 9.5 0.7
Does the evaluation refer to the broad regulatory framework? 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 16.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.0 2.9 1.1 0.0 0.4 0.5 16.9 0.0 2.0 2.1
Does the evaluation raise broad governance issues? 9.3 0.0 123.7 25.2 29.0 33.1 0.0 54.8 35.3 12.1 24.1 1.1 12.7 0.0 25.4 31.4 33.1 59.1 26.2 0.7
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Mention of physical infrastructure problems? 50.1 7.5 2.9 14.5 7.2 1.7 23.1 13.1 8.3 37.3 3.9 21.7 1.0 90.6 0.0 1.7 13.1 2.6 46.2 1.8
Does the evaluation refer to specific regulations? 6.0 0.0 5.9 72.3 17.9 0.8 0.0 1.5 5.2 29.4 29.1 9.1 1.4 11.0 12.1 32.2 6.1 3.8 12.8 0.9
Does the evaluation refer to the broad regulatory framework? 13.9 0.0 2.9 1.2 17.4 30.8 0.0 6.2 6.9 2.0 8.1 9.7 1.2 2.8 2.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 1.7 1.1
Does the evaluation raise broad governance issues? 23.0 23.8 29.4 4.8 29.5 115.8 46.2 20.0 13.3 35.3 17.6 20.3 0.9 8.2 3.0 0.9 13.8 1.3 6.8 1.0
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Mention of physical infrastructure problems? 32.9 49.7 33.5 100.0 94.7 13.8 72.1 38.0 0.6 55.3 40.6 93.6 94.7 114.1 66.5 0.4
Does the evaluation refer to specific regulations? 8.1 4.1 8.9 16.7 0.0 6.2 16.6 9.0 0.7 10.1 2.5 12.8 0.0 11.9 9.5 0.8
Does the evaluation refer to the broad regulatory framework? 1.1 0.2 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.8 1.9 1.8 1.4 0.6 10.6 0.0 5.6 2.4 1.2
Does the evaluation raise broad governance issues? 5.0 5.4 3.4 0.0 0.0 1.7 7.9 5.0 0.9 8.0 0.6 14.9 0.0 14.4 8.5 0.9
Vietnam Vietnam
Ghana Ghana
Transtor Transtor
Overall set of evaluations Narrow set of evaluations
 
Notes: WB: World Bank, J-Eval: joint evaluations, W.Std: weighted standard deviations. 
Source: DEReC database. Authors' computations. 
The narrow set of evaluations provided a more nuanced – and interesting – picture. Generally 
speaking, the narrow set amplified indications that donors showed significant interest in infrastructure, 
especially with the emergence of the World Bank as a key player. It also magnifies the apparent 
consensus among donors that governance is a key issue in Ghana. 
How much attention is paid to supply-side constraints? 
The economic literature on development gives great weight to the importance of supply-side 
constraints in the economic growth equation. Since public sector-related constraints are only one 
aspect of supply-side obstacles, the following section focuses on private sector-related constraints, 
while acknowledging that in practice the line between public and private supply-side constraints is 
often difficult to draw clearly. 
Since the aid-for-trade literature repeatedly underscores the importance of supply side constraints, 
one might expect evaluators to have focussed extensively and systematically on this issue. One might 
also expect evaluators to have provided information on expenditures  or costs—either the direct costs 
involved in completing the operation, or, more interestingly from the perspective of this section, the 
indirect costs to the whole economy of not (or if only partially) completing an operation. In this 
context, one might also expect evaluators to give some sense of whether the private sector grew as a 
result of the operation. Finally, one might also ask whether evaluators showed a systematic interest in 
technical assistance in the broader sense of the term (i.e., not just trade-related technical assistance). 
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The recipient perspective 
Table 2.6A provides a mixed picture.  First, it shows that evaluators failed to address the issue of 
supply-side constraints, both in the overall and the narrow set of evaluations. 
Second, it shows that evaluators focused on expenditures unevenly. Only in the case of Ghana 
were expenditures mentioned frequently, and then only by four donors (Danida, DFID, the EC and the 
World Bank). Moreover, evaluators used the term expenditures in two different ways: first, in the 
context of expenditures exceeding budgets; and second, to differentiate between an operation's 
recurring (often assumed to be covered by the recipient) and non-recurring expenditures (often funded 
by the donor).4 
Third, although the term “private sector growth” appeared rarely in both the overall and the 
narrow sets of evaluations, the term “private sector” appeared much more frequently, reflecting the 
fact that it was often used in neutral statements (e.g., encouraging the development of the private 
sector by enhancing the business environment in which it operates) and not in the context of 
evaluating specific operations (see Chapter 3). 
 
Table 2.6A.  Supply-side constraints, by recipient 
 
Ghana Vietnam Transtor Ghana Vietnam Transtor
Does the evaluation mention supply-side constraints? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Does the evaluation refer to expenditures (costs)? 34.2 10.8 14.7 37.9 2.7 13.8
Does the evaluation refer to private sector growth? 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1
Does the evaluation deal with technical assistance? 15.5 13.6 26.0 20.4 21.3 28.8
Overall set Narrow set
 
Source: DEReC database. Authors' computations. 
The donor perspective 
Shifting to donors, Table 2.6B shows that for the broad set of evaluations, none of the keywords 
reached the threshold of 25 occurrences per 100 pages, both for the two countries and for the TranStor 
sector. The terms “supply-side constraints” and “private sector growth” were uniformly absent in all 
evaluations. The term “expenditures” was mentioned only in the case of Ghana. The rest of the picture 
is fragmented. 
                                                     
4
  It is worth mentioning that the term was used to refer to public expenditures. It is particularly true for the 
TranStor sector for which several evaluations stressed the lack of involvement of the private sector in 
the management of infrastructure. 
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Table 2.6B. Supply-side constraints, by donor 
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Does the evaluation mention supply-side constraints? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 --
Does the evaluation refer to expenditures (costs)? 10.9 8.6 10.5 37.0 56.2 26.6 7.7 0.0 2.5 51.5 36.4 1.0 12.2 8.6 43.3 69.3 26.6 50.0 44.0 0.7
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Does the evaluation mention technical assistance? 6.5 13.8 13.2 26.7 14.2 23.4 0.0 0.0 5.0 13.0 14.8 0.8 6.9 13.8 31.3 14.5 23.4 22.7 20.9 0.5
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Does the evaluation mention supply-side constraints? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 --
Does the evaluation refer to expenditures (costs)? 6.1 6.3 5.9 12.0 3.9 2.5 0.0 8.5 6.5 62.7 46.0 10.8 1.4 1.8 0.0 2.6 8.5 1.3 2.7 1.2
Does the evaluation refer to private sector growth? 64.2 1.3 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.8 0.0 3.1 0.7 0.0 0.2 20.5 2.9 0.5 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.2 2.1
Does the evaluation mention technical assistance? 27.0 18.8 0.0 6.0 25.6 2.5 0.0 11.5 4.0 13.1 19.2 13.6 0.9 32.7 26.3 2.6 11.5 1.3 21.3 0.9
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Does the evaluation mention supply-side constraints? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 --
Does the evaluation refer to expenditures (costs)? 14.2 7.4 20.7 0.0 0.0 7.2 11.2 14.7 0.9 14.6 5.6 17.0 0.0 16.3 13.8 0.7
Does the evaluation refer to private sector growth? 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.2
Does the evaluation mention technical assistance? 31.8 11.1 13.8 0.0 0.0 24.1 21.6 26.0 0.8 38.0 9.4 8.5 0.0 13.7 28.8 1.0
Vietnam Vietnam
Transtor Transtor
Overall set of evaluations Narrow set of evaluations
Ghana Ghana
 
Notes: WB: World Bank, J-Eval: joint evaluations.  W.Std:  weighted standard deviations. 
Source: DEReC database. Authors' computations. 
A similar pattern emerges for the narrow set of evaluations, with the exception of the expenditure 
item for Ghana. All of the words continued to have very low frequencies in the evaluations, even 
though, as noted above, they reflect key priorities in the aid-for-trade agenda. 
How much attention is paid to performance? 
The basic aim of evaluations is to provide a sense of whether operations - projects, programmes 
or general aid policies – performed according to expectations. Given that development is such a broad 
subject, it more difficult to come up with a concise or exhaustive list of words and terms that might 
reflect evaluators concerns with development outcomes.  
However, the following words – ranging from more precise to more general – were identified as 
key to such a list: economic growth, competitiveness, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability, poverty 
reduction and gender gap. A brief description of these terms – and the rationale behind their selection - 
is provided in Annex B. 
The recipient perspective 
The frequency with which key development-related words appeared in evaluations of donor 
operations is presented in Table 2.7A. One clear observation emerged: namely, that the more general 
words and expressions were mentioned much more frequently than the more precise ones. On the 
surface, this observation is puzzling, given that it is presumably harder for evaluators to assess an 
operation using general words and expressions, such as poverty reduction or gender, rather than by 
using more precise ones, such as economic growth. The answer may lie in the fact that, as illustrated 
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by the qualitative analysis (see Chapter 3), evaluators typically used these words and expressions to 
state an operation's objectives, not to assess an operation's performance in meeting these objectives. 
Table 2.7A.  Development performances, by recipient 
 
Ghana Vietnam Transtor Ghana Vietnam Transtor
Economic growth? 6.0 5.8 7.9 8.1 12.4 12.4
Competitiveness? 0.3 2.4 1.6 0.5 12.0 2.5
Efficiency? 11.4 11.2 24.0 9.7 18.7 34.5
Effectiveness? 24.8 19.0 16.3 24.5 22.6 19.1
Sustainability? 24.0 15.0 26.8 27.1 24.4 33.4
Poverty reduction? 23.9 21.5 14.4 27.7 8.1 24.6
Gender gap? 19.2 20.2 8.3 22.1 6.5 3.9
Overall set Narrow set
 
Source: DEReC database. Authors' computations. 
The donor perspective 
The frequency with which key development-related words appeared in evaluations of recipient 
operations is presented in Table 2.7B. Several observations can be drawn from it. First, the terms 
economic growth and competitiveness were rarely mentioned by evaluators, with one exception, GTZ 
in Vietnam. Second, the other key words and expressions were used more frequently, but generally did 
not reach the threshold of 25 occurrences per 100 pages. Third, the pattern was somewhat different for 
Ghana, on the one hand, than for Vietnam and the TranStor sector, on the other. In the Ghana’s case, 
two donors, CIDA and DANIDA, used the widest range of key words most frequently. In the case of 
Vietnam and the TranStor sector, however, the picture was more fragmented, with several donors 
using a wide range of words, but fairly infrequently (e.g., the EC for Vietnam). 
The narrow set of evaluations amplifies the observations made for the overall set. Most of the 
donors focussed on sustainability, poverty reduction and the gender gap in the case of Ghana. But in 
the case of Vietnam and the TranStor sector, the frequencies were scattered across donors. 
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Table 2.7B.  Development performances, by donor 
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Refer to economic growth? 17.7 5.2 5.3 6.0 4.2 12.1 3.8 0.0 1.0 2.1 5.7 0.9 17.5 5.2 6.7 4.9 12.1 6.8 8.1 0.6
Refer to competitiveness? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.1 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.2 3.2 0.0 0.7 1.8
Refer to efficiency? 37.0 0.0 26.3 12.7 15.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.3 13.6 1.3 33.9 0.0 7.9 18.9 0.0 0.0 13.6 1.4
Refer to effectiveness? 19.9 0.0 36.8 24.0 42.5 27.4 15.4 3.8 7.0 24.5 26.0 0.7 19.6 0.0 22.8 40.3 27.4 11.4 26.8 0.7
Refer to sustainability? 49.4 19.0 50.0 29.2 17.1 45.2 11.5 20.2 15.4 10.6 23.7 0.6 38.1 19.0 26.2 18.7 45.2 45.5 27.7 0.4
Refer to poverty reduction? 64.9 0.0 68.4 32.5 21.0 89.5 26.9 1.9 0.5 12.6 27.8 1.0 65.6 0.0 30.7 21.6 89.5 38.6 37.3 0.8
Refer to gender gap? 30.7 0.0 44.7 34.2 17.5 38.7 3.8 26.9 7.0 7.6 20.8 0.7 25.4 0.0 38.8 12.8 38.7 25.0 26.8 0.6
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Refer to economic growth? 10.6 3.8 0.0 4.8 9.2 1.7 7.7 2.3 3.1 11.1 3.0 5.8 0.7 15.6 16.2 1.7 2.3 34.4 12.4 1.0
Refer to competitiveness? 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.8 44.2 0.0 6.2 1.0 0.0 0.5 2.4 2.4 6.9 8.1 46.1 6.2 2.6 12.0 1.3
Refer to efficiency? 18.4 1.3 14.7 8.4 27.5 4.2 53.8 10.8 4.5 9.8 19.4 11.2 0.9 22.7 41.4 4.3 10.8 3.8 18.7 1.0
Refer to effectiveness? 20.8 7.5 35.3 95.2 44.9 5.0 69.2 17.7 12.7 13.1 30.0 19.0 0.9 24.2 49.5 5.2 17.7 14.1 22.6 0.8
Refer to sustainability? 18.0 15.0 35.3 4.8 37.7 30.0 38.5 28.5 9.5 19.0 16.4 15.0 0.5 13.0 50.5 31.3 28.5 32.1 24.4 0.4
Refer to poverty reduction? 25.2 0.0 5.9 59.0 32.9 2.5 0.0 0.8 10.4 102.6 51.5 21.5 1.2 9.2 12.1 2.6 0.8 17.9 8.1 0.8
Refer to gender gap? 5.3 1.3 108.8 6.0 18.8 0.8 0.0 2.3 28.0 3.3 50.8 20.2 1.6 0.3 26.3 0.9 2.3 28.2 6.5 1.2
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Refer to economic growth? 9.8 9.5 7.9 16.7 21.1 1.7 6.3 7.9 0.6 13.9 8.8 19.1 21.1 7.8 12.4 0.4
Refer to competitiveness? 1.6 2.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 1.6 1.2 2.1 4.4 0.0 0.0 3.3 2.5 1.0
Refer to efficiency? 27.0 32.2 4.9 50.0 10.5 3.4 28.5 24.0 0.8 36.5 31.9 17.0 10.5 33.7 34.5 0.4
Refer to effectiveness? 16.1 26.2 2.5 16.7 5.3 11.4 15.9 16.3 0.6 19.7 25.6 6.4 5.3 15.9 19.1 0.6
Refer to sustainability? 26.0 34.0 6.9 66.7 5.3 31.0 37.8 26.8 0.7 30.5 46.9 21.3 5.3 39.6 33.4 0.6
Refer to poverty reduction? 16.6 10.9 25.6 83.3 5.3 6.9 16.0 14.4 1.2 27.2 5.0 57.4 5.3 23.0 24.6 0.9
Refer to gender gap? 1.2 23.5 16.7 16.7 0.0 27.2 2.9 8.3 0.9 0.6 8.1 46.8 0.0 5.6 3.9 1.6
Transtor Transtor
Vietnam Vietnam
Overall set of evaluations Narrow set of evaluations
Ghana Ghana
 
Notes: WB: World Bank, J-Eval: joint evaluations.  W.Std:  weighted standard deviations 
Source: DEReC database. Authors' computations. 
Section 3.  Concluding remarks 
Does this quantitative exercise offer any common lessons?  Or - perhaps more accurately, given 
the limited results from both the overall and narrow sets of evaluations - does it offer any salient 
“questions”? The following two lessons/questions emerge as the most important ones. 
First, there were few clear links between a donor and specific issue, meaning there were few 
systematic “leaders” in terms of evaluations on a given topic, or for a given country and/or sector. One 
donor might pay attention to a particular issue for one country, but then completely ignore that same 
issue for another country (or sector). Systematic evaluations should thoroughly examine all potential 
issues and topics; and if one key topics is ignored, it should be for clearly stated reasons. If this 
interpretation of the data is correct, then it argues strongly for a serious effort to establish more 
detailed guidelines - and a stricter system of reviews - for evaluations (which in turn might allow 
greater freedom and creativity in evaluations). 
Second, the key words and expressions that are most precise, from an economic analysis 
perspective, tended to appear less frequently. Moreover, evaluations gave little information on the 
broader economic context in which the operations were taking place (the “general equilibrium” 
perspective), making it difficult to clarify key policy linkages. 
This was particularly striking for the linkages that would have been easiest to assess. For 
instance, the fact that evaluators ignored trade policy instruments suggests that they had little 
understanding of – or gave little weight to – the extent to which the rate of return of operations could 
be reduced or increased by such instruments. High tariffs on inputs crucial to an operation would 
obviously limit its effectiveness, just as high tariffs imposed on foreign substitutes to an operation's 
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output could artificially increase the operation's benefits. Including this kind of analysis in evaluations 
would be useful for recipients in particular, allowing them see just how damaging high tariffs are to a 
country’s interests. It would also be useful for donors, underlining the contradictions and costs of 
inconsistent policies—e.g., advocating freer trade in general, while accepting a high tariff structure in 
a particular case if it boosts the return on donor operations. 
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CHAPTER 3:  QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
Summary of the results 
• For all the issues considered, the qualitative analysis in this chapter largely echoes the 
conclusions reached in the quantitative analysis in the previous chapter. 
• The qualitative analysis reveals that an operation's impact on trade was clearly not the focus 
of evaluators’ work. Indeed, in a number of cases, the trade impact was never explicitly 
addressed. 
• While some terms indicating an attention to policy linkages appeared in a number of 
evaluations, the qualitative analysis reveals that these terms were not well defined and their 
use was not substantiated by reference to hard evidence. 
• The qualitative analysis reveals that evaluations focused more on broad, development-related 
concepts than on precise trade issues – and that even the development-related concepts were 
interpreted vaguely and narrowly. For instance, gender was either mentioned in passing as a 
cross-cutting issue, or measured in terms of short-term and irrelevant objectives that had 
little meaningful bearing on women’s economic or societal situation (such as the number of 
women who attended seminars, as part of an operation). 
• The qualitative analysis reveals that evaluators rarely incorporated relevant time dimensions 
in their assessments, and suggests two key reasons for this: First, little ex ante economic 
analysis of the operations was undertaken, meaning that the operation’s objectives remained 
un-quantified and there was no baseline information from which evaluators could measure 
an operation's impact. Second, and to a large extent consequently, there was little economic 
analysis undertaken in most evaluations. 
Introduction 
A “quantitative” analysis of key words and expressions works best in a large set of evaluations. 
This chapter presents a “qualitative” analysis of the narrow set of 43 selected evaluations (an 
evaluation on Vietnam for 2010 was added in the qualitative analysis because of some particularly 
interesting features, see below). Its main aim is to test the observations made in the previous chapter. 
With the goal of applying a coherent methodology across country-related and sector-related 
evaluations, the following series of 49 questions was applied to the narrow set of evaluations to 
explore the characteristics of each operation, and to assess the evaluations’ outcomes. The narrow set 
of 43 selected evaluations was not based on word frequencies but on readings insights. 
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Characteristics of the evaluated projects Type of evaluation (next) 
1 Aid for Trade focused? 26 Population specific? 
2 Trade-related?  27 What population? 
3 Product-specific? 28 What product? 
4 Which products? 29 Is the timeliness evaluated? 
5 Project, programme or general aid policy? 30 Is the respect of the budget evaluated? 
6 Population specific? 31 Qualitative? 
7 Which population? 32 Field mission? 
8 Donor specific? 33 Quantitative? 
9 Country specific? 34 Primary data collection? 
10 Date of implementation of the project under scrutiny? 35 Indicators? 
Type of evaluation 36 Econometric analysis? 
11 Is the project's success assessed? 37 Estimation of benefits? 
12 Is the project definition/conception evaluated? 38 Is there any type of robustness analysis? 
13 Is the impact in trade explicitly considered? 39 Is the impact on the environment estimated? 
14 Is the impact on trade explicitly measured? 40 Is the socio-economic impact estimated? 
15 Is the impact on poverty reduction explicitly considered? 41 Is the impact on governance and institutions estimated? 
16 Is the impact on poverty reduction explicitly measured? 42 Is the rate of return calculated? 
17 Period under scrutiny? Evaluation outcome 
18 Part of a repeated evaluation process or one shot? 43 Is the project found to be successful? 
19 Do they relate to previous evaluations? 44 Is the impact on trade found to be positive? 
20 Is the initial situation well identified? 45 Is the impact on poverty reduction found to be positive? 
21 Is there any type of benchmarking? 46 Rate of return? 
22 Is causality identified in any way? 47 Any delay? 
23 Explicated methodology? 48 Length of the delay? 
25 Product-specific? 49 Budget respected? 
 
However, this common framework needed to be tailored to the specific countries and sectors, and 
when applied to a particular set of evaluations. The framework also needed to be adjusted to fit the 
specific design and purpose of certain studies. 
A DEReC evaluation can examine either a specific project or a broader “review” of a collection 
of projects (grouped according to specific sectors, such as infrastructure or private sector development, 
or according to themes, such as trade facilitation or poverty reduction). Reviews usually provide a 
long-term perspective,5 and they rely, not just on evaluations, but also on desk studies. One example is 
AsDB’s review of its infrastructure development operations under the umbrella of the “Greater 
Mekong Sub-region programme”. Focusing on the theme of trade facilitation, the review considered 
                                                     
5
 Thus, reviews are different than programme evaluations. One such example is the review of ADB’s 
infrastructure development and the “Greater Mekong Subregion programme”. Through the lenses of trade 
facilitation the review considers several projects implemented between 1990 and 2009 and refers to various 
thematic impact assessments, for example the impact on the reduction of time travel but also on the spread of 
HIV and the impact on poverty reduction.  Such ADB “special evaluation studies” assess the impact of all 
ADB operations in one sector or under one type of programme. SIDA uses the same type of approaches when 
assessing their Business Training programme considering operations from 1998 to 2006.   
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several infrastructure projects implemented between 1990 and 2009, and encompassed various 
thematic impact assessments, such as travel times, the spread of HIV, or poverty reduction. 
The framework was adjusted depending on the purpose of the project and whether it had a direct 
aid for trade-orientation. For each country and sector, the following sections will explain the 
characteristics of the selected evaluations, the methodology followed, and the issues covered. Each 
section then assesses the overall aid-for-trade impact of the operations. 
Section 1.  Aid for Trade in Vietnam 
The set of selected evaluations  
Out of the 64 evaluations made available by the OECD (specific to Vietnam or to a set of 
countries including Vietnam), ten were selected and classified according to the WTO Aid for Trade 
Task Force's definition of aid for trade [OECD, 2006]. Thus these 10 evaluations were grouped into 
three categories: trade-related technical assistance (TRTA), infrastructure and private-sector 
development. The international dimension was taken as the first discriminator. Operations focused on 
the domestic market were not included in the selection, even though they could have some spill-over 
effects on trade (e.g. a project aimed at producing paper for the Vietnamese market). 
Table 3.1 presents these ten evaluations. Trade clearly did not figure nearly as prominently in 
evaluations of private sector development projects compared to evaluations of TRTA and 
infrastructure projects. The qualitative analysis of Vietnam’s narrow-set of evaluations reveals that 
only “reviews” looked at trade enhancement and poverty reduction in any detail. This was mainly 
because reviews are concerned with long-term impact assessments, whereas the focus of project 
evaluations tends to be more short term. It is also worth noting that such reviews are specific to AsDB. 
Table 3.1.  Key data for the narrow set of evaluations: Vietnam 
Evaluation 
Category 
Evaluation 
date 
Institution 
Period 
under 
scrutiny 
Programme/
Project 
Review/ 
Evaluation
Word occurrences: frequency per 100 
pages 
trade export import 
Sustain-
ability 
Poverty 
TRTA 
2007 
SECO-
UNIDO 
2004-
2006 
Project Evaluation 35 88 2 16 6 
2008 EU 
2005-
2008 
Project Evaluation 340 36 11 51 31 
2009 SECO 2007 Project Evaluation 119 33 14 5 5 
2009 SECO 
2004-
2007 
Project Evaluation 372 462 5 48 5 
Infrastructure 
2003 ADB 
1990-
2000 
Project Evaluation 24 35 28 33 2 
2008 ADB 
1992-
2008 
Programme Review 299 49 30 13 21 
2010 ADB 
1992-
2009 
Programme Review 246 90 33 0 315 
Private Sector 
Development 
2006 SIDA 
1998-
2004 
Programme Evaluation 14 3 1 32 32 
2006 ADB 
1983-
2006 
Programme Review 24 6 4 6 18 
2009 GTZ 
2005-
2009 
Programme Evaluation 32 13 0 31 4 
Average all 
evaluations) 
          35 13 3     
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Another important point worth noting is that all the selected evaluations scored a positive rating, 
even if some included less satisfactory points. That said, there were notable differences among the 
various categories of operations evaluated. Some based their assessments just on field missions 
(consisting in interviews with non-statistically selected stakeholders), whereas others also made use of 
objective indicators, such as the rates of return in infrastructure and private sector development 
operations. The extent to which donors harmonise their operations with each other and with the 
government was also usually noted - and positively rated - in the evaluations. 
Assessment of the Aid for Trade dimension: methodologies and issues covered 
The methodologies used by evaluators were highly dependent on the type of operation being 
assessed. For example, quantitative tools were barely used for assessing TRTA operations, but were 
used extensively for evaluating infrastructure operations. However, two general comments apply to all 
selected evaluations. 
First, an operation's impact on producers, exporters, and importers was hardly ever evaluated, 
with the exception of a few case-studies in the SECO-UNIDO evaluation. According to many 
evaluators, this reflected the failure to collect relevant data during the operations' implementation, and 
the insufficient time between the end of operations and the start of evaluations, especially for TRTA 
evaluations. Another reason for this omission was that the direct beneficiaries of most operations was 
governments - as well as a few private-public partner organizations – so evaluations tended to be 
short-term and focussed on government clients. 
Second, few studies made use of economic models to assess the impact of infrastructure 
programmes on poverty reduction; the one study that did was not an evaluation stricto sensu, but 
rather a prospective analysis. In none of the other evaluations were econometric tools employed to 
identify causality. Indeed, the AsDB and SIDA frequently made a point of mentioning the need for 
more robust analysis in their evaluations. Only the “reviews” addressed trade or socio-economic 
impacts – and here the impact assessment was usually subjective.  
TRTA operations 
Four TRTA operations were implemented to strengthen institutional reform in Vietnam, as part of 
the country's effort of open its economy and accede to the WTO. Each was focused to setting up 
workshops or developing certification and testing facilities – all with the overarching objective of 
sharing information on the implications of WTO rules, and helping Vietnam to move up the export 
value chain. There was a clear bias in this set of TRTA evaluations, in that three of the four were 
sponsored by SECO either as the principal donor or as a partner with UNIDO or SIDA. The fourth 
evaluation assessed an EU funded operation. 
All of these evaluations were carried out by independent consultants. They followed donors’ 
guidelines and analyzed the operations' impact, relevance, efficiency and sustainability, as well as their 
effect on a series of broader, cross cutting issues, such as gender or environment. 
All the evaluations were qualitative, based mainly on field missions. Evaluators frequently 
complained about being unable to assess the outcome of operations more thoroughly because the 
failure to collect baseline data against which progress could have been measured through indicators. 
This suggests that project conception should be clarified from the start, with the basic information and 
data needed to assess a project's success provided in advance. The sustainability of operation outcomes 
was one of the most poorly documented dimensions. Not only was it never supported by quantitative 
evidence, but the concept itself was poorly understood – with the focus on the sustainability of the 
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project (i.e., whether budgets were renewed or operational authority was successful transferred to 
Vietnamese officials or partner organizations) rather than on the sustainability of outcomes (notably in 
terms of trade). 
Last but not least, the link between an operation's implementation and poverty reduction was 
considered only in the context of the project objectives - and the results were never assessed. The 
causal link between the various TRTA projects and trade development was never clearly established, 
other than by relying on the evaluator's intuition. 
The operations' outcomes were assessed according to two criteria: first, the effective 
implementation of the project, such as the number of participants at workshops (a poor indicator of 
participants' capacity to implement any knowledge gained); and, second, interviews with stakeholders 
to determine their relative satisfaction. Outcomes were never assessed in terms of the effective transfer 
of knowledge or the operations' direct impact on trade. In fact, assessments were largely subjective, 
with evaluators often repeating the expression “in our view”. 
Infrastructure operations 
All three evaluations referenced in Table 3.1, under the infrastructure category, were AsDB 
evaluations. Two of them relate to the same regional programme. One of the three was a working 
paper by independent authors employed by the AsDB Institute, while the other two were undertaken 
by the AsDB’s Operations and Evaluation Department. It is not surprising that the last two evaluations 
follow a similar pattern, based on a well-defined methodology, and  systematically rate the relevance, 
effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of the projects' objectives and outcomes. Moreover, 
the evaluations look at comprehensive programmes—not stand alone projects—meaning they should 
be classified as long term “reviews”, with evaluators assessing the impact of the whole endeavour 
rather than the impact of a single and short-term initiative.  
Generally these evaluations employ a more robust impact assessment methodology. When 
assessing the impact of infrastructure projects, AsDB evaluators collected primary data from 
implemented projects. They undertook quantitative data collection, such as traffic or border-crossing 
point counts, as well as qualitative surveys (called “perception surveys”), with the aim of assessing the 
impact of trade facilitation projects on the movement of goods and people across borders. In contrast, 
much of the information used for assessing the impact of operations on socioeconomic parameters, 
gender, and environment was secondary data gathered from government and private-sector officials. 
Unfortunately, such survey data does not lend itself to thorough econometric analysis. However, it 
does allow evaluators to estimate some economic benefits that will flow from a project's 
implementation. A good illustration is the evaluation of Saigon’s port rehabilitation project. Evaluators 
were able to forecast cargo handling performances - and the evolution of various other flows – based 
on whether or not the project was implemented - a task made possible because key indicators were 
already defined and available pre-implementation as part of the initial project outline. However, the 
evaluation team was not able to identify the extent to which these economic benefits were passed on to 
the Vietnamese economy as a whole. 
Three factors could explain why evaluators use quantitative tools more extensively in evaluations 
of infrastructure projects than in evaluations of TRTA operations. First, the time frame for 
infrastructure projects is much longer than for TRTAs projects (the two AsDB infrastructure projects 
covered more than ten years), meaning that evaluators have scope to employ more sophisticated 
assessment tools. Second, donors are keen to ensure the profitability of their investments in large-scale 
infrastructure projects, and they typically insist on the importance of gathering ex ante information - 
and employing relatively rigorous methodologies - when evaluating the impacts of the projects they 
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financed. Finally, the outcomes of such operations (e.g., whether the number of cargo ships using new 
harbour facilities increased) are easier to monitor and evaluate quantitatively than the outcomes of 
TRTA operations (e.g., whether entrepreneurs and or officials usefully employed the knowledge 
gained in workshops). 
The AsDB review of the “Greater Mekong Subregion” (2008) deserves special mention. It was 
one of the most thorough evaluations covered by this meta-evaluation. Not only was the time frame 
long enough for evaluators to measure impacts quantifiably, but the review also included various 
impact studies directly relevant to the programme. Although these impact studies had more than one 
focus (i.e., socio-economic, trade, investment or poverty reduction issues), they provided evaluators 
with valuable information based on robust methodologies which, when taken together, offered a 
comprehensive assessment of the programme's overall impact. For instance, the AsDB (2010) 
document quantified the links between infrastructure investment and poverty reduction, using a multi-
region, general equilibrium model, supplemented with household survey data (it did not assess the 
effective impact on poverty but rather estimated its impact on an ex ante basis). 
As for the trade impact, evaluators consistently failed to make the link between infrastructure 
initiatives and programmes aimed at developing trade and investment. For example, the evaluators of 
the Greater Mekong Subregion programme assessed the success of infrastructure development and the 
creation of transport corridors, but they pointed to the need to transform this transport corridor into an 
“economic corridor.” However, the available case studies analyzing the impact of the project could 
already establish the link between the operation and the development of trade within each country. 
New projects focusing on trade facilitation would, in their view, enlarge this impact to inter-country 
trade.  
As shown in the analysis of the frequency with which the word “trade” is mentioned in the 
evaluations, there is a tendency for evaluators to focus more on “exports” than on “imports”.  In this 
respect, the AsDB infrastructure reviews and evaluations stand out as exceptions. The evaluation of 
Saigon’s port rehabilitation, for example, highlighted the importance of imports for Vietnamese 
businesses, and pointed out that a decrease in import prices of key inputs, such as such as fertilizer, 
steel or iron, was crucial for the development of Vietnam’s economy. Moreover, the same 
observations made for Vietnam were also made for the TranStor evaluations. 
Private sector development operations 
Three evaluations relating to operations on private sector development – undertaken by SIDA, 
AsDB and GTZ - were selected from the pool of all the available evaluations. The qualitative analysis 
of these three private-sector development evaluations offers the same basic impression as the earlier 
analysis of word occurrences.  In none of the evaluations, with the possible exception of the GTZ 
study, was trade explicitly considered, nor was the impact on poverty ever assessed, even in the 
longer-term reviews.  
The AsDB evaluation is a wide review of all its private-sector development operations from 1985 
to 2006. Thus Vietnam is just one case study among several, and the assessment of project 
performance relies mostly on an examination of investment performance. The focus is on performance 
and strategy, not impacts. Only a few details are mentioned about one AsDB project that, according to 
the Operation Evaluation Department, created jobs and had an overall positive socio-economic impact. 
The SIDA and GTZ evaluations suffer from the same shortcomings as the TRTA operations’ 
evaluations. That is to say, they rely mostly on qualitative information derived from field evaluations 
and interviews with beneficiaries, none of which were selected on the basis of objective statistical 
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methods. Following donor guidelines, evaluators made an effort to address the projects' broad impact, 
in areas such as poverty reduction, the environment, gender, sustainability and relevance. However, 
the lack of necessary data, combined with the insufficient time between the projects' implementation 
and the evaluations, precluded any quantitative measurement of impacts. As a result, for example, the 
gender impact (when mentioned) was assessed according to the number of female trainees 
participating in workshops. SIDA evaluators frankly complained about the lack of control groups or 
primary data collection which would have allowed them to assess the direct impact of the projects – 
especially as Vietnam was experiencing a period strong economic growth at the time. That said, the 
two evaluations contained a more robust quantitative analysis than the TRTA evaluations, and a more 
comprehensive attempt to assess longer-term issues. For example, the SIDA evaluators mentioned, not 
only the direct beneficiaries of the private-sector development operation, but also the “ultimate” 
intended beneficiaries, meaning small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (although they were 
unable to assess the impacts). Evaluators also noted the importance of allowing sufficient “maturity 
time” for entrepreneurs to absorb and benefit from programmes before attempting to assess their 
impacts – and the impossibility of drawing any useful conclusions when time frames were too short. 
As a result, the evaluators felt unable to infer that SMEs growth was a consequence of any specific 
project outcome. The same weakness hampered the GTZ evaluator's capacity to assess the impact of 
programmes aimed at employment and private-sector development.  
Outcomes of evaluations: does aid for trade work? 
Reaching clear conclusions about what works and why in aid for trade remains difficult. Existing 
evaluations tend to tell us much more about how an operation was implemented - and its economic 
sustainability (with information on rates of return, for example) - than about how it impacted on trade 
or poverty reduction. From this narrower perspective, however, most selected evaluations were 
positively rated. 
It is important to highlight once again the uniqueness of Vietnam in this meta-evaluation, whether 
in terms of the clear linkages between Vietnam’s WTO accession and the implementation of the aid-
for-trade agenda, or the Government's firm commitment to trade and business development. In short, 
Vietnam served as an ideal “laboratory” for the aid-for-trade agenda. 
Despite the positive synergies in Vietnam, however, evaluators proved unable to provide a robust 
impact assessment of aid for trade on trade performance, and even less on poverty reduction. Even 
though the relevance of many operations was beyond doubt in this context, it remained difficult to 
infer any direct causality between the implementation of aid-for-trade operations and Vietnam’s 
positive economic and trade dynamic.  
Final remarks 
The above analysis highlights the importance of distinguishing between evaluations and reviews 
(that is, between short-term and long-term evaluations). Long-term studies were much more relevant 
in terms of analyzing the extent of one donor’s action and its impact on cross-cutting issues. 
Cross-cutting issues (e.g., the environment, HIV/AIDS, gender, etc.) are mandatory points that 
evaluators must consider in order to follow donors’ guidelines and fulfil their terms of reference. 
However, most of the time, evaluators highlight the irrelevance of such issues to project outcomes, or 
the lack of data and information needed to undertake assessments. Because of its specific setting, the 
Greater Mekong programmes evaluation was able to address the impact of improved infrastructure on 
cross-cutting issues, such as HIV/AIDS. When HIV/AIDS was mentioned in other evaluations, 
however, it was considered irrelevant to the type of operations evaluated. As for the environment, 
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apart from the AsDB evaluation of Saigon’s port rehabilitation project, this issue was only mentioned 
as a consequence of economic development in general. The important link between environmental 
issues, economic development and infrastructure improvements was never disputed in the evaluations, 
but the impact assessment was usually too abstract, too general, and dependant on too many other 
factors to be relevant. As for gender issues, they were almost always mentioned in evaluations, but 
through the lens of irrelevant or unusable statistics, such as the percentage of women participating in 
various training workshops. 
Section 2.  Aid for Trade in Ghana 
The set of selected evaluations 
Out of the 41 evaluations available for Ghana in the DEReC database, seven had to be eliminated 
either because they were not ex post evaluations (but rather ex ante examinations of operations to 
decide whether they should be financed), or because they were not concerned directly with Ghana. 
Of the remaining 34 evaluations, 13 were selected for the qualitative analysis, spread equally 
across projects, programmes, and aid policies. Given the small number of evaluations available, and 
their tenuous links to trade, the selection procedure was based on a simple criterion. As long as an 
operation was aimed at facilitating the integration of developing countries into the global economy 
through the expansion of trade (even if this objective was marginal), it was selected.  As a result, 
among the 13 evaluations selected, only a fraction of them can be said to evaluate an aid-for-trade 
operation stricto sensu. Had a stricter criterion been used, the number of selected evaluations would 
have been too small to draw statistically meaningful conclusions. What is more, even the most trade-
related evaluations chosen cannot really be considered aid for trade-focused. For example, none of the 
evaluations has a true international trade dimension; when international trade issues are considered, it 
is only “en passant”. 
It should be noted that this broad definition of aid for trade used in selecting the narrow set of 
evaluations for Ghana is very different from the definition adopted for Vietnam and TranStor 
evaluations. As a result, the data can be compared only with caution. To some extent, the lower 
frequency of “trade words” in the Ghana set is to be expected since the evaluations were not directly 
concerned with aid for trade. 
As shown in Table 2.2, the 13 operations evaluated were strongly biased towards aid policies, 
which account for over half of the selection, and represent two thirds of the total “aid policy” 
evaluations available in the stock. This unsurprisingly shows that most aid policies tend to have some 
aid for trade component. This also shows that less frequent trade-related word occurrences are to be 
expected because evaluations of this type are usually longer and concerned with a wider range of 
issues. A third of operations evaluated in the selection were programmes (this also represents a third of 
such evaluations available in the total stock), while the remaining two-thirds were concerned with 
specific projects (accounting for only a sixth of the available project evaluations in the stock). To the 
extent that the evaluations in the DeREC database are representative of operations being undertaken 
and evaluated in Ghana, it seems clear that donors do not focus on aid-for-trade projects in Ghana. 
This might be due to the poverty-reduction priorities of the Government and some donors and/or to a 
wide reluctance to recognise the potentials gains from trade. However, it is difficult to reach any firm 
conclusions given that there is no complete list of the operations which donors have undertaken and 
evaluated, so the representativeness of the DeREC database cannot be assessed. 
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Assessment of the aid-for-trade dimension: methodologies and issues covered 
Issues covered:  the elusive quest for trade 
The issues that the evaluations covered closely followed the guidelines adopted by donors (which 
in turn reflect DAC guidelines). As a result, evaluations most often investigated the impact of 
operations on poverty reduction, the environment, social and gender issues, as well as on private sector 
participation – as in the case of Vietnam.6 
In contrast, the trade impact was not always explicitly considered. In fact, although all 13 
evaluated operations dealt with trade-related issues, such as supply-side constraints or transport and 
energy market issues, none were explicitly designed to advance trade objectives. What is more, when 
the impact on trade was mentioned, it was most often couched in theoretical or hypothetical terms, and 
never systematically measured or verified. Returning to the word count exercise, the total occurrence 
of the word trade within evaluations selected is 13 times per 100 pages on average, half the figure for 
poverty reduction. This gives a good idea of the evaluators’ limited focus on trade. 
In addition, the qualitative reading of the 13 selected evaluations indicates that the word trade 
does not occur in trade-impact analysis, but rather in the country context provided by evaluators. In the 
“aid policy” evaluations reviewed, only one had a paragraph explicitly evaluating the impact of several 
operations on international trade (those related to transport). It also contained a few paragraphs 
examining the impact of operations on private-sector development, and on the diversification of 
Ghana’s productive/export base. However, these paragraphs were relatively short, and, like the other 
selected evaluations, did not contain quantitative impact measurements. 
Methodology used in the narrow set of evaluations 
As mentioned above, most of the evaluations were based on a set of criteria that closely followed 
DAC guidelines. However, these criteria were used: (i) to look at short-term impacts only, or at the 
characteristics of the operations; and (ii) in the absence of techniques that would have allowed for the 
evaluation of performance in a satisfactory and comparable way. Regarding the first issue, most 
evaluations assessed the relevance of operations in term of whether they fit the country context, 
addressed the Government’s objectives and strategies (i.e., the policy linkages), and met budget, 
disbursement and implementation targets. Regarding the second issue, the evaluations' impact findings 
were often hypothetical or superficial, and lacked objective measurement. Indeed, none the 13 
evaluations used quantitative tools, and the evaluation processes never involved data collection, 
construction of indicators, or quantitative techniques. Lack of data was frequently mentioned as a 
shortcoming of the evaluations—especially the lack of baseline data that would have made possible a 
comparison of the ex ante and ex post situations. When evaluators described their methodologies, they 
relied exclusively on one or both of the following tools: (i) the analysis of documents obtained from 
officials and sector stakeholders, and (ii) the analysis of the results of field interviews with relevant 
stakeholders and/or focus groups. These same tools were also being used informally in evaluations 
where no particular methodology was identified.  
Such practices are problematic in two respects. First, it is difficult, if not impossible, to assess 
operations' outcomes through non-quantitative methods alone. Second, the non-quantitative analysis is 
itself challenging and problematic, as the evaluators themselves acknowledged. Not only were key 
documents often unavailable, but evaluators rarely explained how those documents that were available 
                                                     
6
 In AfDB evaluations, community participation and regional integration are also considered – the latter being 
of interest in an Aid for Trade perspective (although, as will be shown below, little information is provided). 
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were systematically analysed, and how their results were derived. As a result, evaluators did not assess 
the quality and reliability of the sources which provided the main input in their evaluations. Here, it 
should be noted that the evaluators themselves were well aware of the non-significance (in statistical 
terms) of their results. 
It is also worth noting that in some evaluations economic theory was used to predict the possible 
impact of operations, and to judge the relevance of their design. While this approach does not address 
the causality problem, it does improve the quality of the a priori evaluation of a project. 
Outcomes of evaluations: does aid for trade work? 
It has to be stressed that the reading of available evaluations does not offer a definitive answer to 
the question of whether – or why – aid for trade works for Ghana. This is because evaluators were 
unable to identify causal links between operations and performance. The results reported in 
evaluations regarding funds disbursed and projects implemented appear to be mixed. One recurring 
problem appears to be the operations' sustainability: several evaluations reported positive results in the 
short-term, but less positive results over the long-term because of financial uncertainty. Evaluators 
also mention the difficulty of tackling both growth and poverty reduction objectives simultaneously. 
For example, in one evaluation, support to the agricultural sector was said to have a pro-poor positive 
impact—by successfully targeting of poor recipients—but it was also said to have failed to promote 
growth or export diversification—raising serious questions about the sustainability of its pro-poor 
impact. Conversely, this same evaluation found that support for the transport sector had a positive 
impact on growth, but not on poverty reduction, as it was targeted mainly at the richest regions. 
It is to be feared that reports of an operation's poor performance in terms of implementation also 
suggest that its impact on trade and poverty-reduction were limited at best. As a result, evaluations that 
lack instruments to identify causality probably also miss large positive results in terms of long-term 
impacts. 
The nature of evaluations available for Ghana (mainly programmes or ‘aid policies’) probably helps 
explain the methodological limits outlined above. Indeed, such operations are difficult to assess given 
the complex factors impacting performance on a sectoral or macroeconomic scale, as opposed to the 
performance of a specific project in a specific context. The paucity of trade results might also reflect 
the absence of trade-related objectives in the operations' terms of reference. 
Section 3.  Aid for Trade in TranStor 
The TranStor sector is trade oriented by nature. All programmes or projects are devoted to 
rehabilitate, maintain or construct transport infrastructures (roads, rails or ports) and, at least 
indirectly, will normally lead to enhanced trade and economic growth, as well as reduced poverty. The 
World Bank (2007) provides a review of the literature on the importance of transport in the delivery 
chain, and the link between transport and poverty. Transport costs account for a large part of the value 
of imported and exported goods throughout the world. Especially in African or landlocked countries, 
transport costs seriously weaken the terms of trade of such countries7. The World Bank (2007) 
underscores the fact that transport effects on poverty reduction are not well understood but “growing 
                                                     
7
 According the World Bank (2007), 11.5 percent of the total value of imports to Africa is related to transport 
costs, and 20 percent of export costs and up to 55 percent for landlocked countries such as Malawi. There is an 
extensive literature on this matter, of which relevant examples are from Hummels (2007), Raballand, G., and P. 
Macchi (2008), Djankov et al. (2006). 
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evidence links transport investment to the improved well-being of the poor”.8 Finally, although these 
effects are largely indirect, “most direct poverty-targeted interventions such as schools, clinics, or 
nutrition programmes depend on transport in one way or another”. In addition, in evaluations 
assessing the general background of the country in which a project operates, importance is given to the 
role of geography. For instance, landlocked or island countries are addressed differently given their 
unique geographical characteristics. These characteristics are carefully mentioned when designing the 
objective of the project.  
The set of selected evaluations 
Out of the 64 studies and evaluations covered by the DEReC database, twenty were selected 
because they had an international trade dimension (Table 3.2). The background of this narrow set of 
selected evaluations – as well as the 64 studies available in the DEReC database – is very similar. The 
proportions of donors in the overall and in the narrow set are quite comparable (with the AsDB 
counting for a majority of the evaluations). The same is observed for the projects’ implementation 
dates, which largely cover the period 1995-2000. Several evaluations refer to specific projects, while 
others refer to a set of projects (a programme). 
Table 3.2.  Key data for the narrow set of evaluations: the TranStor sector 
ID Implementation 
date 
Period 
under 
scrutiny 
Institution Programme Type Product or 
sector 
Countries 
1 1995-2005 1995-2007 WB Programme Review ?  
6 1996-2004 1996-2007 AfDB Project Evaluation Road Cameroon 
7 1995-2001 2000-2005 ADB Project Evaluation Road Lao 
9 1994-2001 1994-2003 WB Project Evaluation road, bridge, rail Croatia 
12 1997-2005 1995-2007 ADB Programme Review road, railway China 
13 1985-2005 1985-2005 ADB Programme Evaluation road, bridge Pakistan 
17 1995-2001 1994-2005 ADB Project Evaluation port, expressway China 
30 ? 1997-2007 Denmark Projects Review Road  
38 1991-1998 1989-2001 ADB Project Evaluation road, bridge Lao 
42 1989-1998 1989-2001 ADB Project Evaluation Port Vanuatu 
43 1992-1998 2000 ADB Project Evaluation Port Maldives 
44 1988-1997 2001 ADB Project Evaluation Port India 
49 1988-1998 2002 ADB Project Evaluation Road Indonesia 
50 1993-2000 2002 ADB Project Evaluation Airport Mongolia 
56 1992-2001 2004 WB Project Evaluation Road Sierra Leone 
57 1981-2000 2000 AfDB Programme Review Road All five African regions 
58 1986-1999 2004 AfDB Project Evaluation Highway Tanzania 
61 1992-2003  Japan Programme Review Road, bridge Cambodia 
62 1992-2008 2008 ADB Programme Review Road, rail, airport Mongolia 
63 1987-2007 2007 ADB Programme Review Road, railway India 
 
That said, most transport infrastructure projects pertain to the road sector. The diverse nature and 
quality of road sectors is well represented in the selection, as projects targeted both national and local 
                                                     
8
 The World Bank (2007) provides a series of examples through research projects and surveys. Other papers on 
this issue are provided by Stone, Susan & Strutt, Anna & Hertel, Thomas (2010). 
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roads, expressways, transit roads and even whole networks. The second main sector is the maritime 
sector, and projects focused on maintaining or constructing of ports (most of which, naturally, deal 
with international traffic). Projects focused on bridges, railways and airports were marginal in the 
narrow set of evaluations, as in the overall set. Finally, the narrow set covers a balanced range of 
recipient countries, even if Asian countries are over-represented in the sample. 
Assessment of the Aid for Trade dimension:  Methodologies and issues covered 
Methodologies 
An analysis of the selected evaluations leads to a number of general, as well as specific, 
observations. First, TranStor projects did not target specific populations. Although many projects 
impacted on rural populations, often in farming areas, this was not an objective of the projects per se. 
The same was true for the projects' impact on women. 
Second, the project’s success was always assessed at the project and/or overall level, especially in 
the case of a programme evaluation. As for country-related analysis, different dimensions were 
assessed, such as the projects' outcomes, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, institutional impact, 
socio-economic impact, environmental impact, sustainability or cross-cutting impacts. Although the 
criteria used for each evaluation varied across donors, the more or less followed the Operating 
Evaluation Department's (OED) guidelines. Almost all AsDB’s evaluations took the form of Project 
Performance Evaluation Reports (PPER), which followed the Project Completion Reports (PCR). 
Apart from citing the World Bank (2007) review, there were few references to other similar studies. 
Initial conditions were usually well identified in selected evaluations, with a clear description of both 
the background and the needs of the transport sector in question (best illustrated by the AsDB’s 
evaluations). Despite describing initial conditions, evaluators often lamented the lack of useful 
baseline data to correctly validate the impact of projects. 
Regarding methodologies, there were some disparities among evaluations. Delays and budgets 
were evaluated in all the selected studies. But while all evaluations attempted to provide some sort of 
rate of return (EIRR and ERR) assessment, only a few presented a cost/benefit analysis. Several 
evaluations tried to undertake a robust cost/benefit analysis by assessing alternative scenarios and 
providing sensitivity analysis. 
Regarding outcomes, it should be emphasised that almost all the selected evaluations received a 
positive rating, in the sense that projects were usually found to be successful in meeting their initial 
objectives. Notwithstanding the potential selection bias involved in choosing evaluations from the 
DEReC database, the World Bank (2007) has pointed out that ratings in the transport sector have 
benefited from steady improvements since the early 1990s, and have scored better than other sectors. 
Yet despite satisfactory ratings, almost all projects suffered from delays (an average of 2 years) 
resulting from either internal project weaknesses or external factors. Surprisingly, most projects 
managed to stay within – or even come under - initial budgets. Where there were cost overruns, they 
seem to have been the result of exchange rate changes. 
Covered issues: The impact on trade 
Only half of the selected evaluations explicitly focused on enhancing trade or facilitating the 
movement of goods as priority objectives. The other half focused on reducing transport costs, 
increasing economic growth, or improving living conditions. While international and domestic trade 
was not always explicitly included in the summary description of the project’s objectives, trade was 
always mentioned by evaluators as one of the expected results of the project. However, when it came 
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to measuring trade impacts, figures were hard to come by and evaluators admitted their analyses' 
limitations.  
As pointed out by the Nordic Consulting Group (2008), the universal indicators used in TranStor 
evaluations are Vehicle Operating Costs (VOC), Traffic Flows and Time Saving. For ports projects, 
the basic indicator is the port throughput, a series of efficiency indicators related to the productivity of 
the port. These indicators would have provided a useful basis for assessing the impact of transport 
improvements on trade9, but no extrapolation was done in the 20 evaluations covered. When a 
systematic measurement of transport costs proved impossible, some evaluations attempted to 
approximate the evolution of transport costs following the project's implementation. 
Last but not least, it was generally the case that when trade was assessed; the assessment focused 
more on exports than imports. However, there were several notable exceptions, with some evaluators 
attempting to assess the project's likely impact on the cost of imports for the local population. This 
information was mostly gained through interviews.  
Covered issues: The impact on poverty 
It is important to stress that, even when poverty reduction was not cited in a project's summary 
objectives, many evaluations considered an operation's potential impact on this issue. Among the 20 
selected evaluations, only two focused explicitly on the link between improved transportation and 
poverty reduction or improved living conditions, by examining the construction of schools, health 
centres, cultural centres, small agricultural projects, or water and electrification projects.   
However, several other evaluations tried to assess this impact using a series of proxies or poverty 
indicators, such as school enrolment, access to health (average distance to a centre), the reduction in 
child illness, access to credit, women's participation in the economy, income evolution, and economic 
diversification. These evaluations also relied on socio-economic surveys and interviews, some of 
which were extremely detailed. 
Covered issues: Sustainability 
Most evaluations made reference to “sustainability”, with the goal of assessing a project's impact 
on the environment and socio-economic issues. Under the umbrella of “sustainability” evaluators 
asked two questions: Were projects detrimental to the environment? And did projects provide new 
employments by strengthening the private sector? 
Regarding environmental impacts, the evaluations were very general. The 20 selected evaluations 
generally concluded that the operations' environmental impact was neutral, but they offered little 
robust evidence to support this conclusion. One can assume that transport infrastructure improvements 
– particularly road improvements – resulted in increased traffic, yet the possibility that traffic growth 
would in turn lead to increased CO2 emissions (particularly in developing countries, where vehicle 
emission efficiency is generally lower) was never mentioned in the environmental assessments.  
Regarding the private sector impact, evaluations largely acknowledged the key link between 
transport infrastructure improvements and private sector development. Moreover, private sector 
development was seen as central to poverty reduction in almost all evaluations. Several evaluations 
tried to measure projects' impact on business (especially small business) creation, industrial expansion 
                                                     
9As reminded previously transport cost is a substantial part of import and export value. 
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or even increased tourism. Increased employment – or, more interestingly, the net balance of jobs 
created and destroyed - was also measured in some evaluations.   
Outcomes of evaluations: does aid for trade work? 
The evaluations found that operations' trade impact was positive, based mostly on the growth of 
traffic volumes. However, these conclusions were reached without taking into account counterfactuals 
or the effects of other external factors. Attempts to measure operations' impact on poverty reduction 
suffered from the same weaknesses – although most evaluations saw poverty reduction as an indirect 
outcome and difficult to assess. 
Beyond these common themes, some evaluations also recognised the synergies that can result 
from donors working together. Assessing these synergies - and other potential externalities - is 
difficult to quantify and, at a minimum, requires a certain level of agreement on methodologies among 
donors. This is especially true for a complex sector like transportation which requires coherence across 
modalities (road, railways, etc.) and territories to deliver the expected benefits. In particular, close 
attention needs to be paid to trans-modal coherence in any evaluation. For example, it makes little 
sense for a project to target just one aspect of transport infrastructure, say road maintenance, without 
reference to the broader transport network and regulatory environment of which it is a part. This 
concern is more adequately addressed in programmes evaluations that attempt to assess different 
transport-sector projects together and comprehensively. 
Section 4.  Final remarks 
DAC guidelines were followed relatively closely in most evaluations, in that projects were 
analysed in terms of their relevance, efficiency and sustainability, as well as in terms of their impact 
on a series of cross-cutting issues such as gender or the environment. However, the impact on trade 
was clearly not the focus of evaluators work. In a number of cases; it was not addressed at all. In other 
case, it was addressed only in very general terms, and the operations’ impact on exporters and/or 
importers was hardly ever evaluated. 
Some simple quantitative tools, such as rates of return, were sometimes used, especially when 
infrastructure projects were analyzed. However, except in few instances (such as in TranStor 
evaluations), more sophisticated tools, such as economic and econometric modelling, were rare, 
mainly because of a generalised lack of data collection, both ex ante (during operation 
implementation) and ex post. 
Outcomes differed from one case to the next. While in Vietnam, all selected evaluations generally 
had positive ratings, in Ghana the results were mixed. However, this difference might stem from the 
very different nature of the operations under consideration.  In both countries, donor harmonization 
and coherence with governments were usually mentioned and positively rated in the evaluations. In 
contrast, the operations' sustainability and impact were harder to document, and the outcomes seemed 
less satisfactory. 
It appears that the quantitative (key word count) and the qualitative analyses point to similar 
conclusions - e.g. the stock of Vietnam and TranStor provide a better selection of trade oriented 
projects and even evaluations. Excluding Ghana, the word “export” was more often reported than 
“import”, as suggested above. Finally, the qualitative analysis confirms what the quantitative analysis 
showed – namely, that trade policy issues were rarely examined in the selected evaluations. 
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CHAPTER 4.  WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE:  
LOOKING FOR A SIMPLE APPROACH 
Summary of the results 
• There are huge variations among the evaluation procedures used.  Moreover, economic or 
econometric techniques are uniformly ignored. 
Introduction 
The previous chapters provided a rough picture of the selected evaluations, focusing on “what we 
want to know” and “what we effectively know”. This chapter focuses on “what we should do ideally” 
- and provides some recommendations.  It prepares the ground by examining how current evaluations 
perceive the evaluation process. Then it suggests the kind of things that a model evaluation might look 
at. 
Section 1.  Preparing the ground 
It is interesting to look at the evaluation process as revealed in the evaluations themselves. This 
can be done in three steps: by looking at the evaluation procedures used; by looking at the economic 
instruments used for evaluating operations in other domains; and by looking at the econometric 
instruments used for evaluating in other domains. 
Evaluation procedures 
A frequent complaint of evaluators was that they lacked a robust ex ante assessment of the 
operation. Objectives tended to be defined without first undertaking the work required to make the 
operation “assessable”. In this respect, evaluations in the TranStor sector generally looked better than 
evaluations in Vietnam or Ghana because certain technical, engineering work had been done before 
launching an operation, and this preliminary work required a clear definition of objectives and means. 
It is revealing that the word “objective” appeared much more frequently than the word “outcome”. 
Against this background, it is worth examining how the evaluators themselves perceive their own 
procedures. Table 4.1 presents the frequencies with which four “procedural” terms appeared in 
evaluations. The words “indicators” and “performances” relate to outcomes, while the words 
“monitoring” and “review” relate to procedures that are critical to ensuring the quality of aid for trade 
operations. Table 4.1 shows a notable variation in the frequencies of the four key words, with 
systematically lower frequencies for Vietnam and less systematically lower frequencies for TranStor. 
44 
 
Table 4.1.  Key evaluation procedures, by recipient 
Ghana Vietnam Transtor Ghana Vietnam Transtor
Refer to indicator(s)? 20.9 13.9 61.2 15.3 17.0 16.3
Refer to performance(s)? 49.3 28.0 23.0 41.4 31.2 78.9
Refer to monitoring? 28.7 24.4 37.1 25.7 23.0 18.8
Refer to review? 55.0 44.4 18.7 47.2 41.6 38.1
Overall set Narrow set
 
Source: DEReC database. Authors' computations 
By contrast, procedural words (except for indicators) appear more frequently in the narrow set of 
evaluations more closely related to the aid for trade agenda.   
Key economic techniques 
Shifting from procedural to more substantive issues, Table 4.2 lists several terms that are part of 
routine evaluation work in other domains. The term “impact assessment” captures the idea of an 
integrated approach to public decision-making and is widely used in various national contexts—from 
the expected impact of future regulatory changes (Australia, the EC) to the ex post impact of 
regulatory changes already introduced (the U.S.). The terms “cost-efficiency” and “cost-benefit” 
analyses are well known techniques (with different strengths and weaknesses). Terms such as “short-
term”, “long-term” and “discount rate” are also included in the list. Chapter 4 showed how taking into 
account adequate time horizons plays a key role in the accuracy and quality of evaluations, while the 
discount rate is crucial to cost-efficiency and cost-benefit analyses. Timescale issues are particularly 
important for developing countries which need to more carefully allocate limited resources over time. 
Table 4.2 shows that all these terms were rarely mentioned by evaluators, with the exception of 
“time horizon”. In this respect, the adjective “long term” was mentioned more frequently than “short 
term” (suggesting that, on its own. “long-term” has little meaning without an awareness of the 
discount rate and its role in long-run cost benefit analysis) (Hahn 2000). Here the overall and narrow 
sets of evaluation do not differ greatly. 
Table 4.2.  Key econometric techniques, by 
recipient
Ghana Vietnam Transtor Ghana Vietnam Transtor
Refer to impact assessment(s)? 1.6 0.7 3.0 2.5 3.8 2.0
Refer to cost-efficiency? 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1
Refer to cost-benefit? 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.1 0.0 0.4
Refer to time horizon: short term? 5.6 4.0 2.2 7.2 2.5 2.0
Refer to time horizon: long term? 13.8 12.3 9.2 16.8 8.7 11.3
Refer to discount rate? 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
Overall set Narrow set
 
Source: DEReC database. Authors' computations. 
Key economic techniques 
Other aid domains where public choice is involved (e.g., education, health, etc.) increasingly use 
more sophisticated techniques (for an excellent survey, see World Bank 2009). In order to assess 
whether these techniques were employed by evaluations, Table 4.3 presents the frequencies with 
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which four key terms appeared in the selected studies. Almost all these terms were totally ignored in 
the evaluations in both the overall and narrow sets. 
Table 4.3. Key econometric techniques, by recipient 
Ghana Vietnam Transtor Ghana Vietnam Transtor
Refer to counterfactual(s)? 1.1 1.2 0.3 0.8 0.0 0.3
Refer to control variable? 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Refer to differences in differences? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Refer to randomization? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Overall set Narrow set
 
Source: DEReC database. Authors' computations. 
Section 2.  Options for a better assessment of the Aid for Trade operations 
As mentioned in the introduction, evaluations could be improved by using the economic methods 
captured in Table 4.2 or the more sophisticated methods captured in Table 4.3. A pragmatic approach 
would treat these two tracks as complementary. The advantage of economic methods is that they can 
be used ex ante as well as ex post—and the need of ex ante studies has been highlighted repeatedly by 
evaluators, not least because costs can be kept within reasonable limits (the cost of economic methods 
can also be significantly higher, depending the approach). In other words, economic methods can be 
routinely employed in any evaluation. Econometric methods are by definition more expensive (relying 
on micro-data collection) and require relatively higher skills to administer. In other words, they can be 
used in only a limited number of cases. 
This paper focuses on the first track - which seems the most urgent – and highlights the 
importance of guidelines for evaluating aid-funded operations. However, a key lesson drawn from 
Chapters 2 and 3 is that there is no common pattern in the way donors evaluate their operations. This 
implies that current guidelines many not be precise enough, or may not be implemented strictly 
enough. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to review existing guidelines. It seems more useful to provide 
some information on economic techniques used relatively frequently in other domains – e.g., in 
assessing the impact of future regulatory changes (in order to take into account the essential ex ante 
aspect). 
In this context, Table 4.4 presents the simplified sequence of questions that the Australian Office 
of Best Practice Regulations asks evaluators to undertake when assessing the potential impact of 
regulatory changes. 
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Table 4.4 Impact assessment: an ideal checklist 
Step  1. Identifying the problem 
 1.1 Markets concerned (‘relevant‘ markets) 
 1.2 Market failure 
 1.3 Regulatory failure 
 1.4 Unacceptable risk 
 1.4 Social goals 
 1.5 Assessing the consequences of no action 
Step 2. Defining the objectives of government action 
 2.1 Defining the objective 
 2.2 Defining the outcome 
Step 3. Examining the options that may achieve the objective / outcome 
 3.1 No action 
 3.2 Market-based instruments 
 3.3 Subsidies, taxes 
 3.4 Is there a regulatory option? 
 3.5 Are there other possible options 
Step 4. Impact analysis – costs, benefits and risks 
 4.1 Who is affected by the problem 
 4.2 Who is likely to be affected by the proposed solutions? 
 4.3 Costs 
   To producers 
   To consumers 
   To the community and / or environment 
   To governments 
 4.4 Benefits 
   To producers 
   To consumers 
   To the community and / or environment 
   To governments 
 4.5 Analysing risk 
 4.5 A few key additional points 
   Competition assessment 
   Effect on small businesses 
   Effect on trade 
   Ecologically sustainable development 
   Deviation for international standards 
 4.6 Quantifying the impacts where significant  
   Valuing costs and benefits where there is no market 
   Discounting 
   Sensitive analysis 
   Quantifying the compliance costs 
Step  5. Consultation 
Step 6. Conclusion and recommended option 
Step 7. Implementation 
Step 8. Review 
 
Source: Adapted from the Australian Office of Best Practice Regulation (2008) 
Donors and recipients could adapt such a list to the aid for trade agenda. Such a modified list 
would not replace interviews or field information.  In fact, ideally it would be combined with feedback 
from the people directly concerned with aid-funded operations. Nor would such a list eliminate the 
need for constant review, which serves to both assess the sustainability of operations over time, and 
discipline evaluators. 
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With these qualifications, several specific points need to be made about the “check list” outlined 
in Table 4.4. First, ex ante Steps 1 to 3 are essential and should be well developed – as underscored by 
the qualitative analysis above. Step 1 involving a substantial effort to determine whether the operation 
addresses a market or regulatory failure. Market failures cover a wide range of possibilities – from 
abuse of market power, to asymmetric information, to externalities, to public goods - which require 
different responses than regulatory failures - which in turn require a thorough analysis of the relevant 
regulations in place. Step 2 is about clarifying and defining the objectives—and ranking them 
according to primary and subsidiary outcomes. Too often an operation is treated as a single “stone” 
that can “kill two (or more) birds”. Step 3 is about examining all available options—from no action, to 
market-based instruments (tradable property rights, auctions, etc.), to subsidies, to taxes (with defined 
broadly so that they include international aid, of course), to regulatory reforms – and selecting the 
appropriate response 
Step 4 focuses on impact analysis, and has two aspects. First, it should be done both ex ante – to 
provide evaluators with robust benchmarks - and ex post. Second, it should be interpreted broadly, in 
order to offer a comprehensive view of the operation. For instance, costs should include administrative 
costs, changes in sources of supply, changes in input prices, and so forth. Cost to consumers should 
not only include changes in the price of a good or a service, but also reductions in “utility” (e.g., 
quality, range of choice, etc.), undesirable income or wealth redistribution effects, unemployment, etc. 
Benefits to consumers should be looked at just as comprehensively. Sub-steps 4.4 to 4.6 are self-
explanatory. 
Finally, as noted above, Steps 5 to 8 deal with the inter-active process – i.e., between the policy 
makers and the people directly affected by the operations. Here too the importance of the review 
process (Step 8) cannot be over-emphasised. If a review is done fairly, it can help to build trust 
between policy makers and people. And trust may well be the most crucial input for efficient aid for 
trade. 
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ANNEX A.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE EVALUATIONS, EVALUATORS AND THE TIME 
PATTERN 
As underlined in the introduction, this meta-evaluation deals with only two countries - Ghana and 
Vietnam - and one sector - transport and storage, aggregated for the purposes of this study in the 
“TranStor” sector. As already mentioned, a detailed examination of the 162 evaluations strongly 
suggests that the “aid for trade” component is not equally strong for all evaluations. Thus, besides the 
“overall” set of 162 evaluations, a “narrow” set of 43 evaluations more clearly focused on aid for trade 
issues was selected. The criteria used for choosing these 43 evaluations is described in detail in 
Chapter 3. In short, within each country/sector-specific set of evaluations, the most “aid for trade-
related” evaluations were selected. Hence, the narrow sets were defined in a manner which takes into 
account the specificities of the countries and the sector under scrutiny–they are thus not perfectly 
similar. 
Section 1.  The stock of evaluations under scrutiny 
Table A1 (bloc A) provides an overview of all the evaluations under scrutiny focusing on 
countries (no similar comparison could be made for TranStor since there is only one sector.) It makes 
a distinction between the overall and the narrow sets of evaluations. The overall set, which is the most 
important at this early stage of the meta-evaluation, suggests that operations in Vietnam were more 
intensely evaluated than those in Ghana. 
Table A1.  An overview: the stock of evaluations (1999-2009) 
overall narrow Period overall narrow Period overall narrow
A.  Data on evaluations
Number of evaluations 34 13 1999-2009 64 9 1999-2009 64 20
Number of pages 3312 1858 1999-2009 5719 814 1999-2009 4227 1438
Average length of evaluations 97 143 1999-2009 89 90 1999-2009 66 72
B. Trade data
Exports (current $) 2008 2008
Imports (current$) 2008 2008
Tariffs
average applied tariff (%) 2008 2008
average bound tariff (%) 2008 2008
binding coverage (%) 2008 2008
C.  Macroeconomic data
Population (million) 2008 2008
GDP (current $ bio.) 2008 2008
GDP (at PPP $ bio.) 2008 2008
GDP/capita (PPP $) 2008 2008
Real GDP growth index (2000=100) (2000=100)
Gross external debt ($ bio.) 2008e 2008e
Public debt (% GDP) 2008e 2008e
Economic aid ($ bio.) 2006-2009 2006-2009
D. Poverty data
Below poverty (% pop.) 2007 7.8 2009e
Gini index 2005 37.0 2004
23.7
44.5
2.95
--  
--  
--  
--  
--  
--  
--  
--  
--  
--  
--  
--  
--  
86.2
90.7
240.1
2785.3
179.0
5.8
67.5
1.65
28.5
39.4
23.3
16.1
33.9
1454.9
153.0
Ghana Vietnam TranStor
5.3
10.3
--  
--  
13.0
92.5
14.3
62.7
80.7
16.8
11.4
100.0
 
Source: DEReC, WTO. Authors' computations. For Vietnam, the evaluation done in 2010 included in the qualitative approach 
(Chapter 3) is not included in this table. 
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These observations need to be put in perspective by taking into account the basic differences 
between these two economies. Such differences can be defined in three different ways. First, they 
could be defined in terms of the relative size of trade flows, a definition that echoes the pure “trade” 
aspect of aid for trade. As Ghana’s exports and imports are much smaller (one fourth to one seventh) 
than those of Vietnam, Ghana emerges as much more monitored than Vietnam (Table A1, bloc B). 
Second, the differences between the two economies could be captured by the relative size of 
populations, GDP or other key macroeconomic variables (debt and economic aid). All these 
dimensions shift the focus from the pure “trade” aspect of aid for trade to indicators more directly 
related to development and aid. As Ghana’s macroeconomic indicators are still smaller than Vietnam's 
(roughly one third to one fourth), Ghana continues to be more intensively monitored than Vietnam in 
this context—on average two to three times more intensely (Table A1, bloc C). 
The third possible definition of the differences between the two countries provides a different 
perspective. This definition focuses on income distribution, defined as the share of the population 
below poverty level or the Gini coefficient. As Ghana exhibits higher income distribution than 
Vietnam, Vietnam appears now as more frequently subjected to evaluations than Ghana (Table A1, 
bloc D). This result raises interesting questions—once again assuming that the sample of evaluations 
is representative. Does it reflect the different nature of the operations evaluated, namely projects, 
programmes and general aid policy (see section 2 below)? Or does it mirror countries specificities (it 
may be easier to undertake operations in a country like Vietnam than in a country like Ghana)? Or 
does it reflect the fact that evaluators are more sensitive to key development concerns, such as income 
distribution, if a country has already reached a certain level of development, and seems on a successful 
growth path? 
Section 2.  Different types of operations  
Before going further, it is important to realise that the nature of the operations evaluated varies 
considerably, and that this feature makes the operations more or less easily subjected to evaluations. 
Table A2 presents a breakdown of the evaluations under scrutiny into three main categories, 
depending on the type of operations evaluated. Following the definitions provided by the OECD 
[1992], projects involve “well-defined development activities that are limited in time and space” while 
programmes “consist of all contributions made available to a recipient country for general 
development purposes, i.e. balance-of-payments support, general budget support and commodity 
assistance, not linked to specific project activities”. We further define “general aid policy” as the 
complete body of operations by a specific donor in a specific recipient country in a particular time 
frame. 
Intuitively, the different scope of these three types of operations has an impact on the 
characteristics of the evaluations. Evaluating projects seems less easy to relate to broad trade and 
development issues than programmes and general policy operations for a host of reasons. Projects are 
also likely to be more limited in terms of time horizon (i.e., to be shorter term), and hence may not 
allow sufficient time for assessing consequences. Conversely, evaluating the achievements of projects 
might be methodologically easier than those of a general aid policy, with much larger and long-term 
goals. 
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Table A2.  A breakdown by project, programme and general aid policy 
overall narrow overall narrow overall narrow
A.  All evaluations
Number of evaluations 34 13 64 9 64 20
Number of pages 3312 1858 5719 814 4239 1438
Average length of evaluations 97 143 89 90 66 72
B. Evaluations of projects
Number of evaluations 11.0 2.0 27 5 38 12
Number of pages 670 114 2143 483 1949 566
Average length of evaluations 61 57 79 97 51 47
C. Evaluations of programs
Number of evaluations 12 4 18 4 18 8
Number of pages 1153 485 1675 370 1845 872
Average length of evaluations 96 121 93 93 103 109
D. Evaluations of general aid policy operations
Number of evaluations 11 7 19 -- 8 0
Number of pages 1489 1259 1901 -- 504 --
Average length of evaluations 135 180 100 -- 63 --
Ghana Vietnam Transtor
 
Source: DEReC. Authors' computations. For Vietnam, the evaluation done in 2010 included in the qualitative approach (chapter 
3) is not included in this table. 
Section 3.  The time pattern of the evaluations by recipient 
This section focuses on the time pattern of the evaluations under scrutiny according to recipient, 
by looking first at the overall set, and then at the narrow set, of evaluations. 
The overall set of evaluations 
Table A3 covers the whole set of evaluations. It shows a very different time pattern across 
countries and sectors. The evaluations of operations undertaken in Ghana—whether measured by the 
number of evaluations, the number of pages, or the average length of evaluations—are much more 
volatile than those made in Vietnam, even if, for both countries, the peak of evaluations occurred in 
the years 2004-2006. This volatility can be measured by an indicator of variance. The chosen indicator 
is the weighted standard deviation which captures how far each observation lies from the mean (the 
lower such an indicator is, the lower the volatility is. This indicator of variance is two to four times 
higher for Ghana than for Vietnam. Evaluations on the TranStor sector suggest a time pattern closer 
from the one in Ghana than the one in Vietnam.  
That said, it is essential to go beyond the mere numbers of evaluations or pages, and to provide a 
measure reflecting the potential informational content of the evaluations. As explained in the 
methodology section of chapter 1 (and explained in more details in Annex A), the frequency of the 48 
key words or expressions (the occurrence of such words per one hundred pages) provides such a—
admittedly crude—measure of this potential informational content of the evaluations. 
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Table A3 gives the frequency by recipient for the overall set of the 48 key words or expressions. 
The average frequency of the key words and expressions is notably lower for Ghana than for Vietnam 
and TranStor. Interestingly, the variance is higher for Ghana than for Vietnam and TranStor. 
Table A3.  A overview of the overall set of evaluations: the time pattern by recipient 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 All Weight
years st.dev
Ghana
Number of evaluations 1 3 0 1 0 7 8 8 2 2 2 34 1.00
Number of pages 528 402 -- 109 -- 493 432 851 205 142 150 3312 0.66
Avg length of evaluations 528 134 -- 109 -- 70 54 106 103 71 75 97 1.07
Frequency [a] 546 801 -- 693 -- 413 432 737 865 1403 616 730 0.41
Annual GNI (current $) 460 530 590 630 n.a. --
Vietnam
Number of evaluations 2 4 7 3 5 8 8 9 6 6 6 64 0.38
Number of pages 506 336 506 226 247 564 744 1139 435 679 337 5719 0.51
Avg length of evaluations 253 84 72 75 49 71 93 127 73 113 56 89 0.58
Frequency [a] 353 574 460 506 706 706 824 844 643 938 772 688 0.27
Annual GNI (current $) 620 690 770 890
Transtor [b]
Number of evaluations 2 11 3 11 1 12 6 7 7 4 0 64 0.72
Number of pages 100 1044 112 549 100 498 302 466 812 244 -- 4227 0.75
Avg length of evaluations 50 95 37 50 100 42 50 67 116 61 -- 66 0.41
Frequency [a] 611 587 549 515 690 644 634 642 878 930 -- 671 0.20
 
Note:  [a]  See Annex B for the list of words and expressions 
Source: DEReC. Authors' computations. For Vietnam, the evaluation done in 2010 included in the qualitative approach (Chapter 
3) is not included in this table.   
These observations raise the following question: Are such differences explained by reasons 
related to the recipient countries or by reasons related to the donors? Part of the answer may be related 
to the recipient. 
In the case of Ghana, “at-the-border” policies were subjected to two forces during this decade 
[Trade Policy Review, 2001 and 2008]. On the one hand, the simple average applied tariff fell from 17 
percent in 1992 to 14.7 percent in 2000 and 12.7 percent in 2007. On the other hand, Ghana’s tariffs 
are still largely unbound in the WTO, with a very low binding coverage of 14.5 per cent (see Table 
A1), covering comprehensively, but practically only, agricultural products. This means that, at any 
time, tariffs could be significantly with little risk of retaliation by trade partners. For instance, in 
February 2000 Ghana introduced a “special import tax” of 40 per cent on a significant share of 
consumer goods [Trade Policy Review, 2001].  
What is more, since 2009, the world consensus on open trade policies has come under stress 
because of the global financial crisis and recession. As just noted, because of its low bindings 
coverage, Ghana retains the option of increasing its applied tariffs at any time without risk breaking its 
WTO commitments or being forced to provide compensations to its trading partners. The potential 
reversal of its relatively open trade policy would be easy and quick. This situation is reinforced by 
Ghana’s macroeconomic imbalances which leave open the possibility of threatened or real trade policy 
reversals [Trade policy Review 2001]. 
In the case of Vietnam, the trajectory of its “at-the-border” and “behind-the-border” policies is 
much more ambitiously liberal (this is partly due to the fact that Vietnam was largely a closed 
economy in the 1980s) - and appears firmer - than Ghana's. In trade matters, the decade under 
consideration was dominated Vietnam’s WTO accession negotiations. Vietnam’s Protocol of 
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Accession was ratified in 2007, after a 12 year negotiations (a relatively short period of time). The 
Protocol includes commitments on a wide range of both “at-the-border” and “behind-the-border” 
policies. Vietnam has agreed to bind all its tariffs at an average rate of 11.4 per cent (see Table A1), 
and to undertake ambitious disciplines on non-tariff barriers (from quotas to standards), foreign direct 
investment, services, and intellectual property.  This is in sharp contrast to Ghana which has no 
commitment in many policy areas and sectors. The extremely wide ranging commitments adopted 
under the Protocol have served to reduce fears among donors of policy reversals, even though some of 
these commitments are being implemented at a relatively slow pace. 
The narrow set of evaluations 
As noted above, the overall set of evaluations is heterogeneous, with many evaluations being only 
loosely related to aid for trade.  As a result, Table A4 is limited to the narrow set of 43 evaluations 
which can be considered most robustly linked to aid for trade. 
 
Table A4.  An overview of the narrow set of evaluations: the time pattern by recipient 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 All Weight
years st.dev
Ghana
Number of evaluations 1 3 0 0 0 0 3 4 0 1 1 13 1.24
Number of pages 528 402 -- -- -- -- 205 561 -- 104 58 1858 0.70
Avg length of evaluations 528 134 -- -- -- -- 68 140 -- 104 58 143 1.03
Frequency [a] 546 801 -- -- -- -- 1061 736 -- 1513 336 763 0.50
Vietnam
Number of evaluations 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 2 3 9 1.32
Number of pages -- -- -- -- 46 -- -- 220 51 303 194 814 0.69
Avg length of evaluations -- -- -- -- 46 -- -- 110 51 152 65 90 0.53
Frequency [a] -- -- -- -- 561 -- -- 1274 629 1369 828 1134 0.40
Transtor
Number of evaluations 0 2 2 4 0 3 1 2 3 3 0 20 0.77
Number of pages -- 110 92 162 -- 97 76 160 551 190 -- 1438 0.86
Avg length of evaluations -- 55 46 41 -- 32 76 80 184 63 -- 72 0.67
Frequency [a] -- 634 501 607 -- 787 445 564 1000 1019 -- 819 0.32
 
Note:  [a]  See Annex B for the list of words and expressions 
Source: DEReC. Authors' computations.  
Section 4.  The evaluations by donor 
This section switches the focus from recipients to donors.  It excludes four evaluations from the 
sets of evaluations because the corresponding donors (IDO in the case of Ghana, EBRD, NEI and 
NORA in the case of TranStor) have only one evaluation for the countries and sectors under scrutiny. 
Once again, a distinction is made between the overall set of evaluations and the narrow, more aid for 
trade-focused set of evaluations. 
The overall set of evaluations 
Table A5 suggests several conclusions. First, each donor's share in terms of the number of 
evaluation pages gives a rough sense of the structure of the “supply” side of the “evaluation market”.10  
From this perspective, there is a marked difference between Vietnam and TranStor, on the one hand, 
                                                     
10
 The number of pages seems a more accurate indicator than the number of evaluations. 
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and Ghana, on the other. Evaluations of Vietnam and TranStor are largely dominated by one or two 
donors: SIDA and, to a smaller extent, AsDB for Vietnam (totally 75.9 per cent of all the pages); 
AsDB and (to a notably smaller extent) AfDB and the World Bank (altogether 76.5 percent of all the 
pages) for TranStor. By contrast, the Ghana evaluations reveal no dominant donor, with four donors 
(AfDB, DANIDA, DFID and the World Bank) having almost the same share of pages (15 to 17 per 
cent), although AfDB remains an important provider in terms of the number of evaluations. 
This difference between a supply structure dominated by a couple of donors and a supply 
structure fragmented among several donors is an interesting feature – and might warrant further 
investigation as to whether these differing supply structures contributed to the big dispersion in 
evaluations for Ghana compared to those for Vietnam. That said, it should be stressed that this 
observation is based on evaluations notified to DEReC, not on all the evaluations undertaken by 
donors in these two countries. Thus, it may give a distorted view of the situation. 
Table A5.  An overview of the overall set of evaluations: the donor pattern 
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Number of evaluations 9 -- 1 1 4 5 1 -- 1 -- 1 4 6 -- 33 0.85
Number of pages
total 322 -- 58 38 600 690 124 -- 26 -- 104 201 621 -- 2784 0.94
share (%) 11.6 -- 2.1 1.4 21.6 24.8 4.5 -- 0.9 -- 3.7 7.2 22.3 -- 100.0 0.94
Avg length of evaluations 36 -- 58 38 150 138 124 -- 26 -- 104 50 104 -- 84 0.56
Frequency of key words and expressions [a]
complete list 934 -- 352 1132 900 779 1167 -- 812 -- 513 487 715 -- 868 0.35
coreP list 397 -- 72 587 362 382 373 -- 419 -- 191 149 384 -- 336 0.46
coreP loss rate 42.5 -- 20.5 51.9 40.2 49.1 32.0 -- 51.6 -- 37.2 30.6 53.7 -- 38.7 0.27
Vietnam
Number of evaluations -- 19 2 1 -- 1 2 2 1 3 28 -- 2 3 64 1.55
Number of pages
total -- 1790 80 34 -- 83 162 120 13 130 2721 -- 153 433 5719 1.71
share (%) -- 31.3 1.4 0.6 -- 1.5 2.8 2.1 0.2 2.3 47.6 -- 2.7 7.6 100.0 1.71
Avg length of evaluations -- 94 40 34 -- 83 81 60 13 43 97 -- 77 144 89 0.53
Frequency of key words and expressions [a]
complete list -- 826 358 1035 -- 906 1515 600 708 987 484 -- 827 961 687 0.37
coreP list -- 340 44 538 -- 439 386 273 277 268 161 -- 348 425 257 0.43
coreP loss rate -- 41.2 12.3 52.0 -- 48.5 25.5 45.5 39.1 27.2 33.3 -- 42.1 44.2 37.4 0.31
Transtor
Number of evaluations 9 35 -- -- 3 -- -- 1 1 -- 3 -- 9 -- 61 1.39
Number of pages
total 485 2179 -- -- 203 -- -- 6 19 -- 290 -- 555 -- 3737 1.41
share (%) 13.0 58.3 -- -- 5.4 -- -- 0.2 0.5 -- 7.8 -- 14.9 -- 100.0 1.41
Avg length of evaluations 54 62 -- -- 68 -- -- 6 19 -- 97 -- 62 -- 61 0.58
Frequency of key words and expressions [a]
complete list 782 642 -- -- 643 -- -- 850 716 -- 505 -- 801 -- 674 0.17
coreP list 416 293 -- -- 293 -- -- 283 126 -- 169 -- 367 -- 295 0.37
coreP loss rate 53.2 45.6 -- -- 45.6 -- -- 33.3 17.6 -- 33.5 -- 45.8 -- 43.8 0.30
 
Note:  [a]  See Annex B for the list of words and expressions 
Source: DEReC. Authors' computations. 
Second, Table A5 tries to give a sense of the potential informational content of the evaluations by 
donor, by showing the frequency with which all the words and expressions defined as key appeared. It 
reveals a wide gap—by a factor of four for Ghana, or six for Vietnam—among the donors exhibiting 
the highest and lowest frequencies. The relative ranking of all the donors (for instance, those with 
frequencies higher than the average frequency for the overall stock of evaluations) is relatively stable. 
The same observation is true if one limits the donors presented to those with the highest number of 
evaluations. This stability of results is interesting, since it suggests some systemic factors—but, it 
would need to be tested on a higher number of evaluations for the donors with only a few evaluations 
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in order to be confirmed. In sharp contrast to the countries cases, the frequency gap between donors is 
much smaller in the TranStor case, with a factor of only 1.5. 
These results rely on the overall set of the 48 key words or expressions.  It seems useful to refine 
this list by focusing on subsets of words and expressions considered particularly important (“core”). 
Such a core list is defined by the 30 words and expressions which are considered by the authors as 
truly essential from a purely economic perspective. In other words, it gives a sense of the evaluations 
which are the most clearly driven by economic analysis. The core list of words and expressions is 
provided in Annex A. It consists in three groups (of roughly similar size) of words and expression 
which are related to trade, development and options for future guidance. 
The core list shows much smaller frequencies—revealing a much smaller potential informational 
content on pure economic issues. The “loss rate” (the number of economic-oriented words as a ratio of 
the words included in the overall list) is substantial—on average 38 to 44 per cent. Moreover, it varies 
considerably among donors. It can reach up to 80 per cent, and it is systematically higher than the 
average for a few donors (AFD, EC, SIDA and USAID). Finally, as a result of these different loss 
rates, a new stable ranking emerges among all the donors, with CIDA exhibiting the highest 
frequencies for Ghana and Vietnam, and AfDB for the TranStor sector. 
The narrow set of evaluations 
The narrow set relies on a substantially smaller number of observations (including in terms of 
donors). This feature means that the observations need to be interpreted with caution. However, it 
seems clear that there are one or two dominant donors in this set of evaluations, and that the wide gap 
in terms of frequencies among donors still prevails. 
Table A6.  An overview of the narrow set of evaluations: the donor pattern 
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Number of evaluations 4 -- 1 -- 3 2 1 -- -- -- -- -- 1 -- 12 0.63
Number of pages
total 189 -- 58 -- 508 407 124 -- -- -- -- -- 44 -- 1330 0.87
share (%) 14.2 -- 4.4 -- 38.2 30.6 9.3 -- -- -- -- -- 3.3 -- 100.0 0.87
Avg length of evaluations 47 -- 58 -- 169 204 124 -- -- -- -- -- 44 -- 111 0.64
Frequency [a] 886 -- 336 -- 920 685 1167 -- -- -- -- -- 1184 -- 849 0.37
Vietnam
Number of evaluations -- 3 -- -- -- -- 1 1 -- 3 2 -- -- -- 10 0.50
Number of pages
total -- 392 -- -- -- -- 99 115 -- 130 78 -- -- -- 814 0.80
share (%) -- 48.2 -- -- -- -- 12.2 14.1 -- 16.0 9.6 -- -- -- 100.0 0.80
Avg length of evaluations -- 131 -- -- -- -- 99 115 -- 43 39 -- -- -- 81 0.49
Frequency [a] -- 1260 -- -- -- -- 1783 580 -- 987 736 -- -- -- 1134 0.44
Transtor
Number of evaluations 12 3 -- -- 1 -- -- -- 1 -- -- -- 3 -- 20 1.15
Number of pages
total 942 160 -- -- 47 -- -- -- 19 -- -- -- 270 -- 1438 1.32
share (%) 65.5 11.1 -- -- 3.3 -- -- -- 1.3 -- -- -- 18.8 -- 100.0 1.32
Avg length of evaluations 79 53 -- -- 47 -- -- -- 19 -- -- -- 90 -- 72 0.48
Frequency [a] 791 766 -- -- 847 -- -- -- 716 -- -- -- 953 -- 819 0.11
 
Note:  [a]  See Annex B for the list of words and expressions. 
Source: DEReC. Authors' computations. 
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ANNEX B. A BRIEF PRESENTATION OF THE LIST OF KEY WORDS 
Annex B provides more information on the methodology used in the paper. Table B1 presents the 
complete list of words and expressions that correspond to issues on which, ideally, policy makers 
would like to get more information from field evaluators in order to improve the gains from 
development aid. For instance, when the question “is trade taken into consideration?” is asked, the 
answer is provided by the number of occurrences of the word “trade” in the evaluations. These words 
are divided in three columns:  column 1 lists words related to trade aspects, column 2 those related to 
the development dimensions, and column 3 those related to options for future guidance. There is a 
total of 48words and expressions, almost equally split among these three aspects. 
Table B1.  The complete list of words and expressions 
Trade component Table Development component Table Procedures and techniques Table
trade 2.1 infrastructure 2.5 indicator 4.1
export 2.1 specific regulation 2.5 performance 4.1
import 2.1 regulatory framework 2.5 monitoring 4.1
trade balance 2.1 governance 2.5 review 4.1
comparative advantage 2.1 supply-side constraint 2.6 impact assessment 4.2
gains from trade 2.1 expenditure 2.6 cost efficiency 4.2
trade restriction 2.2 private sector growth 2.6 cost-benefit 4.2
tariff 2.2 technical assistance 2.6 short term 4.2
quota 2.2 economic growth 2.7 long term 4.2
subsidy 2.2 competitiveness 2.7 discount rate 4.2
technical barriers to trade 2.3 efficiciency 2.7 counterfactual 4.3
sanitary/phytosanitary standards 2.3 effectiveness 2.7 control variables 4.3
trade facilitation 2.3 sustainability 2.7 difference in differences 4.3
adjustment policies 2.3 poverty reduction 2.7 randomization 4.3
trade assistance 2.3 gender 2.7
trade-related technical assistance 2.3
WTO 2.4
regional trade agreements 2.4
preferential trade agreements 2.4
 
Section 1 shows that it is very useful to defined “core” words. The core list focuses on words and 
expressions key in the context of economic analysis, as defined by the authors. It is beyond the scope 
of this paper to explain the choice of the core list in detail. And, there are several reasons for not 
including a word in the core list. For instance, the word “trade” is too wide either because it refers to 
realities indirectly important from the international trade perspective on which this paper focuses (for 
instance, it can refer to retail trade) or because it is not precise enough to capture the essence of the 
economic gains from trade (too much trade can be as harmful as too little trade). Table B2 provides the 
list of these words. 
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Table B2.  The core list of words and expressions key from an economic perspective 
Trade component Table Development component Table Procedures and techniques Table
import 2.1 specific regulation 2.5 indicator 4.1
comparative advantage 2.1 regulatory framework 2.5 performance 4.1
gains from trade 2.1 supply-side constraint 2.6 monitoring 4.1
tariff 2.2 economic growth 2.7 review 4.1
quota 2.2 competitiveness 2.7 impact assessment 4.2
subsidy 2.2 efficicency 2.7 cost efficiency 4.2
technical barriers to trade 2.3 effectiveness 2.7 cost-benefit 4.2
sanitary/phytosanitary standards 2.3 sustainability 2.7 discount rate 4.2
trade facilitation 2.3 poverty reduction 2.7
adjustment policies 2.3 gender 2.7
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